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A STUDY OF CONDITIONAL AND TEMPORAL CLAUSES IN PLINY THE YOUNGER

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY

BY

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I.

CLASSIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES.

The conditional sentence in Latin has perhaps given rise to more discussion than any other one syntactical point in the language, and the questions connected with it seem almost as far from settlement to-day as they were when the subject was first investigated. A great deal that has been written is interesting only so far as it shows the phases which the discussion has taken, and many scholars now confine themselves to careful examination of the usage of separate writers, without attempting to treat the subject as a whole. For many years the authors of the early and classical periods have engrossed the attention of classical scholars, and the so-called silver age has been almost untouched. It is, however, necessary for the complete historical treatment of any construction that the later period shall be as well known as the earlier, and it is in the hope of assisting future students of the conditional sentence in Latin that this examination of the usage of the younger Pliny has been made.

Before beginning the detailed study of Pliny's works, it will be necessary to give a brief statement of the chief views of the conditional sentence held by scholars of the present day. Passing over the discussions of the earlier syntacticians, we find that in general conditional sentences are either grouped in three main classes[1] (sometimes four, to correspond with Greek), which may be briefly indicated as Logical, Ideal, and Unreal; or, are not grouped at all by their significance, but merely in accordance with the mood and tense of the *si*-clause.[2] To a certain extent these two methods of grouping correspond, for the norm of the logical condition is *si* followed by the indicative, that of the ideal, *si* followed by the subjunctive of a primary tense, etc. At present the general opinion seems to be in favor of a three-fold division, though Schmalz, the latest authority on the subject, does not

[1] Draeger and Kühner.

[2] Madvig and Schmalz.

commit himself to any general division, and the four-fold scheme still finds advocates, usually with some reference to Greek models.[8]

This three-fold division is based on the *form* of the protasis, which is supposed to correspond to the form of the apodosis, but the most casual examination of the usage of any Latin author will show that unless we admit the theory of the mixture of forms, we cannot bring the types of conditional sentences into accord with the form of the protasis; nor does that always correspond to the form of the apodosis. The division, roughly speaking, holds good, but the exceptions are numerous and varied.

It is evident that the truth, untruth or doubtfulness of a conclusion depends upon the truth, untruth or doubtfulness of the premise. It does not matter, then, in what form the conclusion, considered simply as a separate clause, is stated, so soon as it is brought into relation with the premise it must take colour from it. The grammatical form may remain the same, while the inherent nature of the thought undergoes a complete change. For the purposes of this paper, therefore, it has seemed to me simpler to classify in accordance with the *nature of the conception* of the premise or protasis, without regard to the form in which it may be cast, although it is to be expected that the latter will usually be brought into congruence with the former. It is also clear that the apodosis must in most cases be taken into consideration in order that the exact conception of the protasis may be determined. I propose therefore, in treating conditional sentences in Pliny, to make a three-fold division, using terms that are already familiar, as follows:

1. *Logical:* when premise and conclusion are so stated as not to imply either doubt or certainty, but merely the contingency of the conclusion upon the premise.

[8] Dr. Sebastiano Francina in a pamphlet entitled "Una nota di Sintasse Latina" (Palermo, 1896) takes up the question of conditional sentences in which an indicative apodosis follows a subjunctive protasis, and wants to make four types in Latin, viz: 1. certezza e certezza, 2. possibilità e certezza, 3. possibilità e possibilità, 4. non realtà.

2. *Ideal:* when the premise is stated as figured in the mind, and therefore by implication, the conclusion must be merely figured.

3. *Unreal:* when the premise is stated as an idea which is contrary to either present or past fact, and therefore by implication, the conclusion is or was untrue.

Under these three main headings I shall subdivide in accordance with the forms used, and first I shall consider Logical Conditional Sentences.[4]

II.

LOGICAL CONDITIONAL SENTENCES.

The simplest form of the conditional sentence and the only one on which syntacticians are practically agreed, is that expressed by the indicative in both clauses. Here there can be no doubt that the condition is simply stated without any qualification of its meaning. To quote Madvig's Grammar, § 332: "Such a sentence denotes only that such is the relation which obtains between the two propositions; but nothing is stated of the actual truth of their contents when taken singly." The main interest lies in the connection of tenses, for though any combination is possible, some are much more natural and likely to occur than others. I shall group these sentences then in accordance with the tenses used, simply enumerating them for the most part, since the majority are of types too usual to need comment.

Present in protasis and apodosis.[5]

With si: Ep. I. 3. 2: si te *possident*, felix beatusque *es*. Also I. 10. 12: 11. 1: 13. 4: II. 11. 1: 19. 4: III. 1. 8: 6. 2: 17. 3: IV. 15. 1: V. 6. 25: 6. 44: 20. 5: VI. 6. 9: 20. 10: 23. 3: VII.

[4] For convenience of reference I have cited the Pliny-Trajan letters as book X. of the Epistles, and I have used throughout Keil's text in the Teubner edition of 1870.

[5] Trajan X. 50. 1: 93 bis: 99.

6. 5: 13. 2: 17. 7: 17. 8: 17. 10: 20. 5: 24. 8: VIII. 14. 11: 21. 5: IX. 1. 4: 5. 3: 17. 2: 19. 3: 19. 5: 20. 2: 30. 3: 36. 2: 36. 4: 40. 2: X. 79. 3: Pan. 69 fin: 87. 10.

With si non: Ep. III. 1. 4: si *adsunt* amici, honestissimi sermones *explicantur; si non*, liber legitur. Also VII. 2. 3: X. 49. 2.

With nisi: Ep. II. 3. 7: quem tu nisi cognoscere *concupiscis*, saxeus ferreusque *es*. Also II. 9. 2: 11. 25: 17. 29: V. 8. 4: VI. 17. 4: VII. 20. 6: VIII. 24. 6: IX. 9. 1: X. 108: Pan. 26. 20.

With etenim si: Ep. I. 8. 6: etenim si alienæ quoque laudes parum æquis auribus accipi *solent*, quam difficile *est* obtinere . . . Also II. 7. 7.

With proinde si: Ep. IV. 15. 2: proinde si utrumque nostrum *probas*, de Rufo quoque *necesse est* idem sentias. Also VI. 19. 6.

With nam si: Ep. V. 20. 8: nam si verum *est* Homericum illud . . . *providendum est* mihi . . . Also VII. 33. 2.

With siquando (iterative): Ep. II. 17. 28: nam illuc e pascuis pecora *conveniunt*, siquando aquam umbramve *sectantur*. Also IV. 19. 3.

Present in protasis, perfect in apodosis.

This form is cited by Draeger only from Tacitus after the classical period. It is chiefly ante-classical.

Ep. I. 2. 3: quod me longæ disidiæ indormientem *excitavit, si modo is sum* ego qui excitari possim. This may be explained on the ground that the *si*-clause is restrictive and follows the apodosis, and may therefore be looked on as an afterthought. The next instance cannot be so explained: Ep. I. 8. 12: nam si medici salubres sed voluptate carentes cibos blandioribus adloquiis *prosecuntur*, quanto magis *decuit* publice consulentem utilissimum munus . . . comitate orationis inducere? Here the protasis is generic in present time.

Ep. I. 12. 1: jacturam gravissimam *feci*, si jactura *dicenda est* tanti viri amissio. It may be said that in the last case the *si*-clause has no logical connection with *feci*, but applies to the word *jactura* only. So in Ep. III. 17. 3: ipse *valeo*, si valere *est* suspensum et anxium vivere, we seem to have a mere verbal

dependence of protasis on apodosis, not an inherent connection in thought. It might be possible to expand as follows: si jactura dicenda est tanti viri amissio dicam me jacturam gravissimam fecisse.[6]

Present in protasis, future in apodosis.

Ep. II. 8. 2: numquamne hos artissimos laqueos, si solvere *negatur, abrumpam?* Also I. 5. 5: II. 10. 3: VI. 8. 9: IX. 13. 17: X. 26. 2.

This combination is ante- and post-classical. According to Draeger it is found only once in Cicero, Rep. I. 34: *deligetque* si modo salvus esse *vult.* There is also one example in the Brutus letters, Ep. ad Brut. I. 13. 1: hoc si a te *impetro*, nihil profecto *dubitabis* pro iis suscipere.

Present in protasis, imperative in apodosis.

Ep. I. 18. 5: si tutius *putas* illud cautissimi cuiusque præceptum . . . id ipsum *rescribe.* Also I. 20. 25 bis: II. 20. 3: IV. 6. 3: 15. 11: VI. 6. 9: VIII. 18. 11: IX. 1. 4: Pan. 95. 10 bis.

Present in protasis, imperative subjunctive in apodosis.

Ep. III. 7. 14: si non *datur* factis . . . certe studiis *proferamus.* Also III. 19. 9:[7] Pan. 31. 15: 94 fin.

[6] The first and second examples may fairly be taken as genuine; they are at least as little open to objection as those cited by Draeger (II. 702) but the third is doubtful. Compare Ep. II. 3. 10: et *erat* Æschines, si . . . *credimus* . . . where the *si*-clause must be parenthetical.

[7] It may be interesting to note the negative here. The sentence runs: proinde hoc te *non moveat*, si cetera non refragantur. This use of *non* with the imperative or its equivalent is very rare and chiefly poetic. One case is quoted from Cicero, Pro Cluent. 57: a legibus non recedamus, but this *non* has been explained as adherescent. Otherwise it is not found in the classical period. Later there are sporadic instances, chiefly among the poets. All the cases cited have been explained away, usually by calling in the potential idea, which might conceivably be done here. It seems simpler to accept the subjunctive as an imperative form, and assume carelessness or confusion in the use of the negative.

In these examples all but one (II. 20. 3, *esto*) show the first imperative, which agrees with ante-classical usage. In Cicero the second imperative is more usual.

Perfect in protasis and apodosis.[8]

Ep. VI. 20. 10: si *periit*, superstites (vos esse) *voluit.*

In VII. 4. 8, the verb of the protasis must be supplied: inde plura metra, *siquid otii* (fuit), maxime in itinere *temptavi.* But compare III. 5. 10, where the probable supplement with *siquid otii* is *erat.*

Perhaps II. 12. 6 may be put here, though the sentence is somewhat broken: (epistulam) ex spatio temporis jam *recepisse* te *colligo:* nam et festinanti et diligenti tabellario dedi; nisi quid inpedimenti in via *passus est.*

Perfect in protasis, present in apodosis.[9]

Ep. IV. 30. 11: mihi abunde *est*, si satis *expressi* quod efficitur. Also VIII. 20. 9: IX. 23. 5: 36. 5: With *siquando*, I. 10. 1: Other cases of the perfect with *siquando* are iterative, *e. g.* II. 17. 5: Pan. 55. 7: 80. 13: 81. 16.

Perfect in protasis, future in apodosis.[10]

Ep. VII. 33. 6: si fixum tibi istud ac *deliberatum* (*est*), *sequar* te, ut, siqua ex hoc invidia, non tantum tua. Also IX. 19. 6: memoria nostri *durabit*, si vita *meruimus.* This form is exceedingly rare. Draeger[11] quotes only four examples: Cicero, Phil. 9. 1, Ep. ad fam. VII. 14. 1, Livy, XXII. 60. 14, Tacitus, Ann. III. 12.

There are two examples which may belong in the rare category of Perfect-Imperative. This form Draeger says he knows only in Terence, Sallust and Tacitus. The cases in point are Ep. VIII. 8. 1: vidistine aliquando Clitumni fontem? si

[8] Trajan X. 30 and 71.
[9] Trajan X. 30 and 119.
[10] Trajan X. 30.
[11] Hist. Syn. II. p. 707.

nondum (et puto nondum; alioqui narrasses mihi), *vide*. Here the necessary supplement after the first *nondum* is *vidisti*. The thought is perfectly clear though the form is uncommon. The other sentence is in the Panegyricus, 95. 10: vos modo *favete* huic proposito et *credite*, si . . . substiti . . . malui. Here, though the sentence is long and somewhat involved, the connection of clauses seems to be as I have indicated.

Imperfect in protasis and apodosis.

Ep. III. 20. 5: testis et laudatores *dabat* vel eum sub quo militaverat vel eum cui quæstor fuerat vel *utrumque*, si *poterat*, addebat quosdam ex suffragatoribus. In III. 5. 10 the verb of the protasis is supplied: post cibum sæpe, . . . si quid otii (erat), *jacebat* in sole. The last example is iterative.

Imperfect in protasis, present in apodosis.

Pan. 6. 4: si tamen hæc sola *erat* ratio quæ te publicæ salutis gubernaculis admoveret, *prope est* ut exclamem tanti fuisse. This can scarcely be reckoned as a genuine example, but is merely formal. Draeger, however, has only two examples under this head, and both are open to the same objection. They are, Terence, Phorm. 361: jam adulescenti nil *est* quod suscenseam, si illum minus *norat;* and Cicero, Inv. I. § 89: si ad illum hereditas *veniebat*, veri simile *est* ab illo necatum.

Pluperfect in protasis, perfect in apodosis.

Ep. VIII. 2. 5: siqui forte quindecim milibus *emerant*, hi et quindecim milium octavam et quinque milium decimam *tulerunt*.

Future in protasis and apodosis.[12]

Ep. II. 9. 6: *reddam* vicem, si *reposces*, *reddam* et si non *reposces*. Also I. 3. 4: I. 22. 12: IV. 14. 4: VI. 20. 20: VII. 20. 2: IX. 25. 3: X. 61. 3: Pan. 28 fin: 40. 1.

[12] Trajan X. 78. 3: si milites *erunt*, legatis eorum quod deprehenderis notum *facies;* aut si in urbem versus *venturi erunt*, mihi *scribes*. The future here has the effect of a strong imperative.

This may be due to Ciceronian influence. The form, according to Schmalz, is not common after Cicero except in Vitruvius and Quintilian. Other writers prefer the present in the protasis.

Future in protasis, present in apodosis.

Ep. IV. 18. 2: quodsi hæc, quæ sunt et latina et mea, habere tibi aliquid venustatis *videbuntur*, quantum *putas* inesse iis gratiæ, quæ et a te et graece proferuntur? Also II. 14. 8: IX. 8. 1.

Future in protasis, imperative in apodosis.[13]

Ep. V. 16. 10: proinde siquas ad eum de dolore tam justo litteras *mittes,memento* adhibere solacium . . .

Future perfect in protasis, future in apodosis.[14]

Ep. I. 2: et siquas *addidero*, non *supprimam*. Also I. 3. 5: 20. 24: II. 5. 6: 19. 9: III. 3.2: 5. 7: 9. 25: 10. 3: 13. 5: 21. 4: IV. 1. 7: 12. 1: 15. 3: 15. 13: 21. 4: 27. 3: V. 3. 10: 6. 13: 12. 4: 16. 9: VI. 27. 1: 28. 2: VII. 7. 2: 12. 3: 19. 11: 29. 1: IX. 1. 3: 13. 9: 21. 3: 22. 2: 39. 6: X. 8. 6: 90. 2: 98. 2: Pan. 16. 15: 59. 5: 70. 16 bis: 70. 25: 93.6: with *siquando*, I. 4. 3.

Future perfect in protasis, present in apodosis.[15]

Ep. II. 2. 2: exorare me *potes* uno modo, si nunc saltem plurimas et longissimas *miseris*. Also III. 6. 6: 16. 10: IV. 7. 6: 12. 7: VII. 29. 1: VIII. 1. 2: IX. 13. 12: 21. 4: 29. 2: X. 11. 1.

Two examples which show the future participle in the apodosis may also be put here. Ep. VI. 23. 4: est indolis optimæ, brevi *producturus* alios, si interim productus fuerit a nobis. IX. 39. 3: videor ergo munifice simul religioseque *facturus*, si ædem quam pulcherrimam extruxero.

[13] Trajan X. 32. 2 shows the imperative subjunctive in the apodosis.
[14] Trajan X. 44: 73: 78.
[15] Trajan X. 34. 2.

Future perfect in protasis, imperative in apodosis.[16]

Ep. I. 15. 4: in summa experire, et nisi postea te aliis potius *excusaveris*, mihi semper *excusa*.

With subjunctive-imperative: IV. 13. 11, proinde siquis *fuerit* repertus . . . *eat* ea lege, ut, etc.

There is one case where we find the future indicative in the protasis, while the apodosis has the present subjunctive of characteristic. Ep. III. 6. 5: jam nunc jube basim fieri . . . quæ nomen meum honoresque *capiat*, si hos quoque *putabis* addendas.

There are a few examples where protasis or apodosis shows no verb and where no certain supplement can be made. These are as follows:

Ep. VI. 9. 1: Nasonem mihi? quid si me ipsum?

VII. 9. 3: magna gratulatio, si non nulla tu, magnas pudor, si cuncta ille melius.

VII. 17. 9: utique si latior scæna et corona diffusior.

VII. 31. 1: siquis tamen ultra modum, verecundus.

VIII. 2. 2: nam si paria peccata, pares etiam laudes.

IX. 30. 3: si unum aliquid, minus quidem, laudandus tamen.

With *siquando*: IV. 13. 1: venisti autem, siquando alias, nunc maxime mihi desideratus.

VI. 6. 1: siquando, nunc præcipue cuperem esse te Romæ.

VIII. 4. 5: pande vela, ac siquando alias, toto ingenio vehere.

VIII. 19. 2: proinde siquando, nunc intende libro.

So far the classification has been simple, for the connection of clauses is clear, and the forms employed do not bring in any idea other than that of simple contingency. The examples belonging to the future sphere have at various times been put in a separate class, evidently through the influence of Greek categories. There is no inherent difference in the nature of the thought connection of protasis and apodosis between a past condition and a future

[16] Trajan, with the imperative subjunctive, X. 78. 3 bis.

condition, so long as both are stated with no indication of reality or unreality. The element of uncertainty, from the point of view of the speaker, is no more marked in the future condition than in the past.

But the element of uncertainty or ideality is not the only thing which can affect the mood of the conditional clause. We often find what appears to be an ideal form in the protasis, while the connection of thought is clearly logical. On the other hand, we find what appears to be a logical form in the apodosis, when, if we consider both propositions together, it is clear that the conception is ideal or unreal. Cases of this sort are the most difficult to deal with, for they cannot be classified according to the form of either protasis or apodosis, and the old method of grouping them all under the head of "mixed" conditions is not very satisfactory.

Conditions in which the protasis and apodosis are expressed by diverse moods have been made the subject of a number of special discussions, usually, for obvious reasons, under sub-headings. The most complete treatment that has appeared recently is by Dr. C. Lilie[17] in a Berlin Program for 1884. He takes into consideration all cases where a subjunctive *si*-clause is combined with an indicative principal clause, provided there is no subjective idea of dependence involved. He attempts to class all conditions having this form under one head, and to make a general distinction between these and the true "hypothetical period." In the latter both clauses are in the same position with regard to reality, or unreality, by reason of the agreement of mood. When the indicative is employed in the apodosis, it gives to this clause a definite and prevailing validity in itself, as opposed to the suspense involved in the mood of the *si*-clause. Later[18] he states what he considers the characteristic quality of the conditional period with a subjunctive protasis and an indicative apodosis, as follows:

"In einem Hauptsatze wird ein Zuständliches als unbedingt

[17] Entitled "Conjunctivischer Bedingungssatz bei indicativischem Hauptsatz im Lateinischen." Programm des Humbolds-Gymnasiums.
[18] Page 5.

giltig behauptet, ein posteriorischer Nebensatz giebt den Fall, in dem die Behauptung ihre Bestätigung findet. Es gilt also in ihr immer die Formel: So ist die Sache, die Probe wird's bestätigen, und der Zweck derselben läuft hinaus auf eine besonders nachdrückliche und angelegentliche Versicherung."

That is, where we find a *si*-clause in the subjunctive following an indicative principal clause, we are to suppose that the indicative expresses a thought which, when it was formed in the speaker's mind, was entirely without hypothetical colouring, while the *si*-clause is due to a new conditioning idea which arises later, and is really an afterthought.

This explanation may be defended in a large number of instances where the indicative clause precedes, but it falls to the ground where we find an indicative clause following a subjunctive protasis. Nor are such cases few and exceptional. In not more than one-third of all the examples of this sort of condition in Pliny does the indicative clause come first. This makes the explanation of the subjunctive clause as an afterthought difficult, even if we try to mend matters by using a great many subheadings, which practically do away with any general distinctions. Moreover, to put all conditional sentences having this form under one head must lead to confusion, for we should then have to class together Pliny Ep. VIII. 24. 6: nam timor *abit* si *recedas*, which is clearly logical, and V. 1. 9: igitur sufficere tibi *debet*, si exheredatus a matre quartam partem ab heredibus ejus *accipias*, which is just as clearly ideal.

Apart from the fact that the explanation given by Dr. Lilie cannot be stretched to cover nearly all the examples found, if the conditional sentence is, as I have assumed, a statement of contingency merely, whether it is postulated, or stated as ideal, or as unreal, it is misleading to say that an indicative apodosis states a fact, while the subjunctive protasis adds a limiting afterthought, because whatever may be true of the apodosis considered as a clause by itself, so soon as we bring it into relation with a protasis and so form a complete conditional period, we do not get a statement of fact in any case, but one of relation only. By considering protasis and apodosis apart from one

another, we practically deny that we have a condition to deal with, for the essence of a conditional sentence is the dependence of one clause upon the other.

Disregarding then the grammatical form of both protasis and apodosis, I shall try to classify these sentences as logical or ideal conditions in accordance with the nature of the relation subsisting between the two clauses. Under the head of logical conditions I shall put those examples in which the subjunctive of the protasis is due to the intrusion of the potential idea, either present or past. In the great majority of these the verb of the protasis is in the second person singular. This is due in part at least, to the epistolary form, which naturally leads to a frequent use of the second person. It would of course be possible to take every case where a subjunctive protasis in the second person singular is found with an indicative apodosis, and say that we have the ideal second person, but this does not seem wholly justifiable in view of the fact that we find exactly the same sort of period when the third person is used.

While it is impossible to dogmatise on the subject and say that in one instance we have a definite person referred to and in another an indefinite, it may not be amiss to call attention to those examples where the subject of the protasis seems to refer to a particular individual.

Logical—Present subjunctive in protasis.

Ep. I. 8. 15: ita, si silenda feceris, factum ipsum (culpatur), si laudanda non *sileas*, ipse *culparis*.

It might be argued that since the apodosis of the second condition is in the indicative with the second person, the person in both members must be conceived as actual, not ideal. But the condition is generic, and we may explain by saying that the two forms allowed in generic statement are here so equated that no difference is felt, and the subject of the indicative *culparis* is no more limited to Pompeius Saturninus, to whom the letter is addressed, than the subject of *sileas*. Both verbs express ideality in the sense that the statements made by them are of

general application, not limited to a particular instance. At the same time the condition is logical, not ideal, for it postulates universal truth, and does not put before us an ideal hypothesis.

I. 9. 3: eadem, si cotidie fecisse te *reputes*, inania *videntur*.

I. 20. 10: quod si *negetur*, nulla oratoris, maxima judicis culpa *est*.

I. 20. 23: nam si hos in consilio *habeas*, non solum *satius est* breviter dicere, sed omnino non dicere.

II. 6. 5: si gulæ *temperes*, non *est* onerosum . . . illa (gula) ergo *reprimenda*, illa quasi in ordinem *redigenda est*, si sumptibus *parcas*, quibus aliquanto rectius tua continentia quam aliena contumelia consulas.

This might be put with those ideal conditions in which a verb of obligation in the apodosis brings in the indicative, but since the condition is generic, I prefer to put it here.

III. 4. 6: nam quamlibet sæpe obligati, siquid unum *neges*, hoc solum *meminerunt* quod negatum est.

V. 6. 8: neque enim facile usquam saxum, etiam si *quæratur*, occurrit.

V. 7. 1: hoc, si jus *aspicias*, inritum, si defuncti voluntatem, ratum et firmum *est*.

V. 13. 9: jucundum tamen (*est*) si prohiberi publice *videas* quod numquam tibi ipsi permiseris.

VII. 9. 11: ut laus est ceræ, mollis cedensque *sequatur*,
si doctos digitos jussaque *fiat* opus.

VII. 32. 2: *est* enim, ut Xenophon ait, ἥδιστον ἄκουσμα ἔπαινος, utique si te mereri *putes*.

Here the condition is logical, and the *putes* probably potential, but the *si*-clause might be looked upon as an afterthought, for the thought is complete without it, and the adverb *utique* seems to indicate that the conditioning clause was not part of the original conception.

VIII. 14. 3: difficile *est* tenere quæ acceperis, nisi *exerceas*.

VIII. 16. 5: *est* enim quædam etiam dolendi voluptas, præsertim si in amici sinu *defleas*, cf. on VII. 32. 2.

VIII. 24. 6: nam timor *abit* si *recedas*.

IX. 29. 1: ut satius unum aliquid insigniter facere, quam

plurima mediocriter, ita plurima mediocriter (*satius est* facere) si non *possis* unum aliquid insigniter.

Imperfect subjunctive in protasis.

Ep. VI. 31. 13: *erat* modica, si principem *cogitares.*

VII. 27. 5: si *attenderes* acrius, strepitus vinculorum . . . *reddebatur.*

Occasionally the potential idea affects the apodosis of a logical condition while the protasis remains unchanged. For instance: Ep. VIII. 4. 4: sed nihil est quod non arte curaque, si non *potest* vinci, *mitigetur.* And in the same paragraph: præterea, si *datur* Homero et mollia vocabula et græca ad levitatem versus contrahere, extendere, inflectere, cur tibi similis audentia, præsertim non delicata sed necessaria, non *detur?*

IX. 22. 2: *putes*, siquid in studiis cognatio *valet*, et huius propinquum.

This exhausts the logical conditional sentences in Pliny. It will be found that all the instances here cited simply postulate the condition and might have been expressed by the indicative in both clauses without altering the nature of the conception, though the shading would of course be different.

In all there are 195 examples, of which 153 show the indicative in both clauses, The range of tenses used is wide, and includes almost all the combinations possible. The use of the future in both clauses in 10 instances is to be noted as possibly due to Ciceronian influence. The usual form, namely, present-future, is found only six times. The frequent use of the future perfect is also to be noted. It appears in the protasis 57 times, with the future, present, or imperative in the apodosis. It is not found in the apodosis. The potential subjunctive appears in the protasis 18 times, in the apodosis 3 times. The imperative forms the apodosis in 15 examples, the imperative subjunctive in 6.

In the main, Pliny's use of the logical condition, though varied, conforms to classical models, with marked intrusion of the potential subjunctive.

III.

IDEAL CONDITIONAL SENTENCES.

The normal forms of the ideal conditional sentence are thus laid down by Kühner, vol. II, page 919: "Die zweite Form durch den Konjunktiv, und zwar des Präsens oder Perfekts in Beziehung auf die Gegenwart des Redenden: si hoc facias, wenn du dieses (etwa) thätest, si hoc factum sit, wenn dieses (etwa) gethan wäre; des Imperfekts in Beziehung auf die Vergangenheit: si hoc faceres . . . wenn du dieses (etwa) gethan hättest. Diese Form wird gebraucht, wenn der Redende die Bedingung als etwas Ungewisses, Unentschiedenes, als eine unentschiedene Möglichkeit, als blosse Annahme, Vermuthung bezeichnet wird."

That is, to express doubtful or undecided contingencies Latin employs the subjunctive mood in the protasis, and the tenses used are the present and perfect from the point of view of the present, the imperfect where the point of view of the past enters. This classification, which is based largely on the form used, by no means contents all scholars. In Reisig's *Vorlesungen*[19] the theory of "Subjective Möglichkeit," which plays such a large *rôle* in the interpretation of subjunctive constructions in Latin, is invoked to explain the mood in both ideal and unreal conditional sentences. By the ideal form "soll nichts weiter gesagt werden, als dass man etwas beliebig annehme, ohne auf die Beschaffenheit der Verhältnisse zu reflektiren. Dies lässt also den Gedanken übrig, dass es sein könne oder auch nicht, objectiv betrachtet." And further on *si velit* is amplified "wenn er will, und es ist möglich dass er will, oder auch: ich entscheide nicht ob es möglich ist oder nicht, dass er will. Oder auch: ich nehme an beliebig, dass er will oder nicht."

That is, we have an implied judgment on the part of the speaker as to the possibility, probability, or complete uncertainty of the objective existence of the action figured in the protasis, just as we have, according to the same theory, a

[19] Reisig, Vorlesungen über lateinische Sprachwissenschaft, (edition of 1890, Berlin) vol. II. p. 383

judgment as to the unreality of the state of things figured in the protasis of an unreal condition.

It has often been pointed out that we have no such implication of possibility and the like as an essential concomitant of the subjunctive in these conditions. It cannot be too frequently emphasised that in no conditional sentence considered in itself alone do we have any statement at all of actual (objective) fact or not fact. We have simply the expression of a relation between a premise and a conclusion. Just as in a logical condition we have no implication that protasis and apodosis are statements of fact, so in an ideal condition we have no implication that protasis and apodosis are statements of possibility or the like. In both we get the statement of a relation. The truth, falsehood, possibility or likelihood of premise and conclusion must be gathered, if they are to be gathered at all, from the context, or from the conception itself.

There is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner of statement between the logical and the ideal form, which may be said to correspond to that between objective and subjective statement.[20] In the logical condition we have the activities of both protasis and apodosis put before us *as if* they had actual existence outside the mind of the speaker, though nothing is told us as to whether they really so exist or not. In other words, they are postulated. In the ideal condition, on the other hand, the activities of protasis and apodosis are put before us as ideas in the mind of the speaker. No more information as to the existence or non-existence of the activities in question is given us than in the logical condition, and no less. The conclusion, if the premise be granted, is just as inevitable in the one case as in the other, but the point of view of the speaker is different. In the logical form of statement he looks out on the activities of his premise and conclusion and sees them objectively; in the ideal he looks in upon them and sees them subjectively, as ideas of his own. In other words, they are figured. This difference

[20] Compare Roby, Latin Grammar II. Pref. pp. 99–100; Jahrbücher für Philologie, vol. 143 (1891) pp. 264 ff. and 851 ff. Also Class. Rev. vols. I. pp. 124, 238; IV. 200, 297; VI. 90, 199.

in the manner of presenting the relation applies to the unreal condition as well, as I hope to show later.

To express the subjective conditional relation, for which *ideal* is perhaps as apt a term as we have at present, the Latin language does not always employ the subjunctive in both clauses. At an early date it was observed that a large number of ideal conditions formed indicative apodoses. These forms have been carefully studied and ranged under a number of fairly satisfactory categories. The first treatment of any considerable importance was by Krüger, in his *Untersuchungen der Lateinischen Sprachlehre*, published in 1820. In this (page 331 ff.) he points out that with certain classes of verbs and phrases, mainly those which express possibility, obligation and the like, the past tenses of the indicative are used where we should expect subjunctive forms. This indicative takes on so distinctly a conditional force that it goes over unchanged into actual conditional sentences by what he calls "enallage temporum." His list of the verbs and expressions with which the indicative is found is practically complete, and is as follows:

"1. Posse.

"2. Verben welche ein Müssen, Sollen, Sich-geziemen ausdrücken, wie *debere*, *oportet*, *necesse est*, *decet*.

"3. Gewissen Redensarten, mit dem Positiv sowohl als dem Comparativ, welche den Begriff des Zweckmässigen, Zureichenden, Wünschenswerthen, oder des Bessern, Zweckmässigern u. s. w. ausdrücken, wie *satis*, *par*, *rectum*, *justum*, *idoneum*, *optimum*, *consentaneum*, *melius*, *æquius*, *rectius*, *satius erat—fuit—fuerat*, und dergl.

"4. Part. fut. pass. auf -ndus, in so fern darin der Begriff des Müssens liegt."

Madvig in his Grammar, § 348c, takes up this subject, and says: "The imperfect indicative is often used of a thing which in a certain case which does not actually hold, would, *at the present time* be *right* and *proper*, or *possible* (*debebam*, *decebat*, *oportebat*, *poteram*, or *eram* with a gerundive or neuter adjective), as if to show the duty and obligation or possibility more unconditionally."

That is, in such verbs and phrases the nature of the verbal conception, when it is stated in a past tense, implies the probability of the non-fulfillment of the obligation, possibility, etc., though their existence may be objectively postulated. In such expressions ideality comes to be associated with the indicative of all tenses, and the need for change of mood in the apodoses of ideal and unreal conditional sentences is not felt, unless the obligation itself is ideal, not postulated.

This idiomatic use of the indicative in the expression of ideality is fully recognised by modern syntacticians, but the range of it has not been observed with any fullness. Schmalz,[21] notes it, and says that it is most frequent in the comic poets, and found less often in the classical period. It is revived by Tacitus, chiefly to express iterative action in the present. Later the usage becomes stereotyped, and the examples which appear must be referred to already existing formulas and phrases.

Pliny shows a good many examples of indicative apodoses in ideal conditions, more, in fact, than of the normal form. In translating these, English usually employs the subjunctive, but it is sometimes possible to render the Latin moods exactly and still preserve the shading of the original. For instance, Ep. I. 8. 14, "sequi enim gloria, non adpeti debet, nec si casu aliquo non *sequatur*, idcirco quod gloriam meruit minus *pulchrum est*," may be turned: "For glory ought to be aimed at but not striven for, and if, by some chance, it *should* not be aimed at, that which deserved glory *is* not on that account less fair."

Other examples are as follows:

With *posse*.
Ep. IV. 13. 7: potest, si . . . relinquatur.
Pan. 71. 12: . . . potest, si . . . summitat.
Pan. 85. 11: amari, nisi ipse amet, non potest.
With *debet* and *decet*.[22]
Ep. V. 1. 9: debet, si . . . accipias.
Pan. 7. 13: nec decet . . . si adsumatur . . .

[21] Lateinische Grammatik, Munich, 1900, p. 413.
[22] Trajan X. 115: si . . . velimus . . . necesse est . . .

With the participle in *-ndus*.[23]

Pan. 9. 3: non est habendus socius nisi velis.

Pan. 67. 7: nec verendum est . . . si . . . utamur.

With an abstract phrase.[24]

Ep. V. 21. 2: quamquam ne hoc quidem triste (est), si . . . æstimetur.

Pan. 60. 5: parum est . . . nisi convoces . . . præsideas . . . perroges.

Pan. 75. 20: certum est et quæ facere et quæ debeant audire, si faciant. The subjunctive in this sentence may be due to attraction, but is probably original.

There are a few examples of ideal conditional sentences[25] in which a statement in the indicative is followed by a subjunctive *si*-clause giving the circumstances under which the original statement holds good. The apparent ignoring of the conditioning clause when the first statement is made seems due to a desire for rhetorical effect.[26] Examples of this are:

Ep. I. 16. 2: omnia hæc mire placent, cum impetu quodam et flumine pervehuntur, *placent*, si *retractentur*.

Si has here the force of *etiamsi*, also in V. 3. 9: multa etiam a multis admonetur, et si non *admoneatur*, quid quisque sentiat *perspicit* ex vultu . . .

II. 5. 5: *sunt* enim quædam adulescentium auribus *danda*, præsertim si materia non *refragetur*.

III. 5. 19: qui, si *comparer* illi, *sum* desidiosissimus. In this example *sum* goes closely with *qui*, and in thought precedes the *si*-clause. The example, however, goes to show that the subjunctive clause in sentences of this sort is not an afterthought added to a complete statement, but rather that the indicative is deliberately used to produce an effect.

IX. 13. 26: *habes* epistulam, si modum epistulae *cogites*.

Pan. 67. 19: tibi salus tua *invisa est*, si non *sit* cum rei publicæ salute conjuncta.

[23] Trajan X. 97: si deferantur . . . puniendi sunt.

[24] Trajan X. 69: durum est . . . si velint.

[25] Cf. Lilie, in the Berlin Program already quoted.

[26] Cf. Schmalz, p. 413: "Der Nachsatz mit besonderem Affekt gesprochen ist."

Pan. 67. 20: nihil pro te *pateris* optari, nisi *expediat* optantibus.

Ep. I. 13. 6: *perit* gratia, si *reposcatur*, may be put here, but the subjunctive is probably iterative.

There are some instances of the future used as the apodosis of an ideal condition. Draeger gives examples of this, but shows only a very few after Cicero, and these for the most part poetic. The construction is not found in Cæsar or Livy, and seems to have gradually disappeared after the classical period. Tacitus has four examples, two of them uncertain, while Pliny shows seven.

Ep. VIII. 14. 23: nisi dicente sententiam eo qui relegat illi qui puniunt capite initio statim in alia *discedant*, frustra postea *dissentient* ab eo qui paulo ante consenserint.

Also VIII. 15. 2: IX. 6. 2: X. 61. 3 and 4: Pan. 55. 2: 82. 16.

Perhaps Ep. I. 20. 22, may be put here, taking *volo* as equivalent to a future; si tamen *detur* electio . . . *volo*.

For the sake of completeness I will add a few examples in which the verb of either protasis or apodosis is omitted or involved.

Present subjunctive in apodosis, verb of the protasis omitted.

IX. 3. 1: nisi præmium . . . placeat.

IX. 12. 1: filius . . . si repente pater ille . . . reprehendat.

Present subjunctive in protasis, verb of the apodosis involved or omitted.

II. 17. 11: abunde capacia, si . . . cogites.

Also II. 17. 26: III. 1. 3: III. 11. 7: V. 8. 3 (general idea of fulfillment): VII. 17. 5: VIII. 24. 8: IX. 37. 3: Pan. 7. 22: 9. 20: 14. 10: 38. 20.

Once there is involution of the apodosis with the protasis in the perfect subjunctive.

V. 8. 9: quid, si huic oneri novum accesserit.

Perfect subjunctive in apodosis, involved protasis.

Ep. V. 4. 4: si tamen non ante, ob hæc ipsa *veneris* Romam.

Turning now to the normal form of the ideal conditional sentence, it is noteworthy that Pliny employs it comparatively seldom. The examples are as follows:

Present subjunctive in both clauses:

Ep. I. 9. 2: nam siquem *interroges* "hodie quid egisti?" *respondeat.*

Also IV. 24. 5: 30. 4: V. 6. 25: 14. 7: VII. 17. 5: X. 96. 10.

Perfect subjunctive in protasis, present subjunctive in apodosis.

V. 8. 13: tum, si *laudaveris*, parcus, si *culpaveris* nimius fuisse *dicaris.*

Also Pan. 83. 15.

One other example from the Panegyricus belongs here, and is worth noting; Pan. 17. 8: nec tibi opima *defuerint*, si quis regum venire in manus *audeat*, nec modo telorum tuorum sed oculorum etiam minarumque conjectum toto campo totoque exercitu opposito *perhorrescat.*

The protasis, si quis . . . audeat, has two apodoses, one in the present and one in the perfect subjunctive.

There is one other form of the ideal condition, that is, the ideal from the point of view of the past. Kühner, II. p. 925, gives the following definition: "Wird aber eine unentschieden mögliche Bedingung auf die Vergangenheit bezogen, so wird sie durch den konjunktiv der historischen Zeitformen, meistens des Imperfekts ausgedrückt." In this case we have the same form that we find in the unreal of the present. The difference lies solely in the point of view of the speaker, and this must be decided by the context.

As we saw in the case of the ideal from the point of view of the present, nothing is implied in the conditional sentence itself as to reality or unreality, possibility or probability. We have simply the statement of a relation between two ideal conceptions. If we learn from the context that in a condition expressed by the imperfect subjunctive the point of view of the speaker is present, the employment of the past tense informs us that the actual existence of the state of affairs figured in the protasis is denied, and, consequently, that the apodosis is untrue. If, on the other hand, we learn from the context that the point of view of the speaker is the past, we have simply the statement of what was an ideal conception at some point in the past, to which we are carried back. Here again we are not told anything

more than the relation between two ideal conceptions, so far as the condition itself goes. We may, from our present standpoint, know whether that ideal conception proved to be fact or not, but that is outside the original statement of the condition, and should not be imported into it. If the point of view, then, is present, we have unreality, if it is past, ideality. The line between the two is difficult to draw, and exception may be taken to almost any special case.

It is evident that in throwing the ideal form into the past, the point of view of the present speaker will often coincide with that of the original speaker or thinker. In this way the principle of *oratio obliqua* is brought in, and we get what is called *partial obliquity*. This explains the mood in a great many cases where we seem to have an unreal of the present with an indicative apodosis.

The use of this special form of the ideal sentence is more widely extended than is usually supposed, or at least than is usually stated. Many examples of it are loosely classed under the unreal. Such a sentence as Cæsar. Bell. Civ. I. 73. 2: "*erat* unum iter, Ilerdam si reverti *vellet*, alterum, si Tarraconem *peterent*," gives the commentators and grammarians endless trouble. Some frankly give it up, others explain it as due to a suppressed apodosis[27] such as *quod haberent* or the like. The subjunctive is really due to a shift, not in time, but of the person. *Erat* is from the point of view of the present narrator, while *vellet* is from that given in *erat*. That is, we have partial obliquity, and *vellet* stands for an original *velim*.[28]

[27] Cf. Roby, Class. Rev. I. page 237 note.

[28] Subjunctives of this sort together with those found in temporal clauses after *antequam*, *priusquam*, and especially *dum*, are classed together by some English scholars under the name *Prospective Subjunctive*. Professor Sonnenschein in the Classical Review, vol. VII. p. 7, remarks that "In such cases the imperfect subjunctive marks an action as *future in the past;* or, using the term 'prospective' to mean 'relatively future,' we may say that the imperfect subjunctive has *past prospective* meaning." This is practically the same as saying that the imperfect subjunctive may be used to represent what was, from a point of view in the past, an ideal condition. Later in the same article, page 10,

I have examined the usage of a few authors with reference to this semi-oblique ideal form, and find that Cæsar never uses the imperfect subjunctive to express unreality, but has several examples of it in the ideal sense. For instance, Bell. Gall. VII. 36. 5, erat e regione oppidi collis . . . ex omni parte circumcisus; quem si *tenerent* nostri, et aquæ magna parte, et pabulatione libera prohibituri hostes *videbatur*. Also B. G. VI. 34. 5 and 6: B. C. I. 73. 2: I. 82. 5: III. 110. 4.

Livy has the unreal of the present with the imperfect subjunctive forty-nine times, always in speeches, but the ideal form

objection is made to the introduction of the principle of "virtual oratio obliqua" in these sentences, because it cannot be applied to all the cases to which Professor Sonnenschein wishes to give the name Prospective Subjunctive, especially those after temporal particles. He admits a close relation between these subjunctives and the forms of "reported speech," but considers that the explanation is the futurity inherent in the subjunctive, and that we must explain the use of past tenses of the subjunctive to represent the future in true *oratio obliqua*, as due to the same general principle. He formulates the following rule: "The subjunctive is used as a Future-equivalent wherever reference to the future is clear from the context."

Professor Hale takes up the discussion of the Prospective Subjunctive in the Classical Review, vol. VIII. p. 166 ff., and agrees that it is one of the factors that "combined to establish the subjunctive condition in Latin from the present point of view as well as from the past." The chief value which this discussion of the Prospective Subjunctive has for the present subject, is the emphasis laid on the fact that such sentences as Livy XXI. 5. 11, "invicta acies, si aequo dimicaretur campo," and XXI. 17. 6, "in Africam transmissurus si ad arcendum Italia Poenum consul alter satis esset," are "open, not rejected, conditions." That is, they are ideal, not unreal as they are often considered. At the same time, since no very cogent reason for rejecting the explanation of the influence of indirect speech is advanced, I should be inclined to lay stress on the admission of Professor Sonnenschein, Class. Rev. VII. 10, when he says "it is clear that when an action in prospect is spoken of, there will generally be found some reference to the thought of some one looking forward to the future." The discussion of the Prospective Subjunctive in all its applications does not belong here, but with reference to conditional sentences it may be used as a convenient term to describe the future force of the subjunctive in some ideal conditions, from both present and past points of view.

is also frequent. He has the imperfect subjunctive in both clauses of an ideal condition in XXX. 31. 7: ceterum, quemadmodum superbe et violenter me faterer facere, si, priusquam in Africam trajecissem, te . . . venientem ad pacem petendam aspernarer, sic nunc . . .; where the point of view is evidently past. So too I. 43. 11: VI. 40. 13: XLV. 23. 3.

Instances with an indicative apodosis are more numerous. Livy shows twenty-three. Here, as has been said, the *si*-clause is partially oblique. This is very clearly shown in a number of examples where the future participle forms the apodosis, with or without a finite verb. The meaning of the participial form in combination with a past tense of incompleted action makes it apparent that we have to do with the future from a past point of view; that is, the sentence was ideal to the original speaker, and is now stated with partial obliquity. Whether subsequent events have negatived the condition or not does not affect the conception. Livy has the future participle in the apodosis with *erat*, I. 40. 4: XXII. 25. 6: XXVIII. 28. 11: with *fuerim* (fut. perf.), V. 51. 1: with *fui*, XXXVIII. 47. 4: with *videbantur*, XXXII. 18. 9.

The simple participle as apodosis is found not only in the nominative, but occasionally in the oblique cases.

In the nominative, III. 60. 8: IX. 29. 4: XXI. 17. 6: XXIII. 14. 6: XXXV. 39. 4. Oblique, IV. 18. 6: XLV. 35. 6.

Tacitus has twelve examples of the ideal form with partial obliquity, ten of the unreal of the present, and three cases where the apodosis is formed by the future participle alone. These are, nominative, Hist. III. 54. 6: accusative, Ann. III. 66. 13: ablative, Hist. III. 56. 16.

Pliny's use is similar to that of Tacitus and Livy, but it is to be noted that the ideal of the past with the subjunctive in both clauses is more frequent. So in Ep. II. 5. 11: etenim si avulsum statuæ caput aut membrum aliquod *inspiceres*, non tu quidem ex illo *posses* congruentiam æqualitatemque deprendere, *posses* tamen judicare an id ipsum satis elegans esset.

This must be taken as ideal unless we wish to force the meaning of *inspiceres* to "if you were *now* looking at the severed

head of a statue—and I see you are not," which seems unnatural.

IV. 2. 1: Regulus filium amisit . . . erat puer acris ingenii, sed ambigui, qui tamen *posset* recta sectari, si patrem non *referret*.

Here the point of view must be past, and if the condition were unreal, we should need the pluperfect subjunctive in the protasis.

Pan. 13. 9: cum spectator moderatorque ineuntium certamina virorum arma componeres, tela temptares, ac siquod durius accipienti *videretur*, ipse *vibrares*. The point of view in this sentence is past, but the subjunctive may be due to the iterative idea.

VIII. 14. 18 is not so clear, but I am inclined to consider it ideal; quodsi unus atque idem et perdendos *censeret* et relegandos, num ex sententia unius et perire *possent* et relegari?

The answer awaited is of course "no," but the protasis is not negatived, and the point of view is probably past. So too in the following sentence: videretur . . . si ab uno diceretur.

I. 20. 25 may belong here, though the apodosis is involved: num corrumpi te, qui tibi, si mihi *accederes*, *brevis* epistulæ necessitatem, si dissentires, *longissimæ* inposui?

The apodoses are involved in the adjectives, and the sentence might be spelled out as follows: tibi epistulæ necessitatem imposui, ut, si mihi *accederes*, brevis, si dissentires, longissima *esset*.

There are only two instances of the ideal from the past point of view with indicative apodosis. Ep. VI. 16. 7: mihi, si venire una *vellem*, *facit copiam*[29] (*facit* is historical present).

VIII. 6. 4: *erat* enim contra majestatem senatus, si ferreis prætorius *uteretur*.

The future participle is used as the apodosis to an ideal condition once, the protasis is oblique. Ep. VI. 20. 4: inrumpit cubiculum meum mater: surgebam invicem, si *quiesceret*, *excitaturus*.

[29] See Kraut, Syntax und Stil des jüngeren Plinius. Schönthal Programm, 1872, p. 34.

The following table will show more clearly the comparative use of the ideal from the past point of view and the unreal from the present point of view in Cæsar, Livy, Tacitus and Pliny.

	Ideal.	*Unreal.*
Caesar ..	Impf. subj.—impf. indic. 6	.....
	6	
Livy.....	Impf. subj.—impf. subj. 4	(always in speeches) 49
	" " — " indic. 23	.....
	" " —fut. ppl..... 7	.....
	34	49
Tacitus...	Impf. subj.—impf. subj....	10
	" " — " indic. 12	 4
	" " —fut. ppl..... 3	.....
	15	14
Pliny ...	Impf. subj.—impf. subj . 5	23
	" " —hist. pres... 1	.....
	" " —impf. indic . 1	.....
	" " —fut. ppl.... 1	 2
	8	25
	Total 63	88

Pliny uses the ideal conditional sentence in *oratio recta* 60 times. Of these, 17 examples have either protasis or apodosis involved. Of the remaining 43 examples, 28, for one cause or another, show indicative apodoses, leaving only 15 with the subjunctive in both clauses, which is the norm. Five of these are the ideal from the point of view of the past, and have the imperfect subjunctive in both clauses.

IV.

UNREAL CONDITIONAL SENTENCES.

The unreal conditional sentence, usually expressed by the imperfect or pluperfect subjunctive, is Kühner's third class, and is defined by him, page 927, as follows: "Die dritte Form des Bedingungssatzes . . . bezeichnet eine Bedingung, von welcher der Redende weiss, dass sie nicht in Erfüllung gehen wird, oder nicht in Erfüllung gegangen ist. Die Wirklichkeit der Bedingung wird verneint."

Other authorities give similar definitions, but it should be remembered, as we have seen in considering the ideal condition, that the unreality in the case of conditions expressed by the imperfect subjunctive is dependent not on the form of the protasis, but on the point of view of the speaker. It is, in fact, inferred from the context. In the unreal of the past, expressed by the pluperfect subjunctive, we have no ambiguity. We are sure that the state of things figured in the protasis is not true without reference to the context. This does not make this class an exception, differing from other conditions, in that we have a judgment of the speaker as to objective fact or not fact, in accordance with the theory of "subjective Möglichkeit." The unreality felt by the hearer in cases of this sort is due to the inevitable inference that he makes from the tense used. The subjunctive simply states the condition as *thought* on the part of the speaker, but the tense is that of completion in the past. An action stated as complete in past time, and at the same time stated as ideal merely, by almost necessary inference is objectively untrue.

That the sub-implication of unreality in such sentences is due to the nature of the tense may be supported by the fact that the pluperfect indicative in logical conditions, where no implication as to objective reality or unreality is possible, is very rare, except in iterative sentences, where "if" equates "whenever." In unreal conditions, then, as in ideal, we have subjective statement of a conditional relation. The unreality is not due to the mood, but is inferred; in the case of the unreal

of the present, from the context in each given instance, in the case of the unreal of the past, owing to the peculiar nature of the tense used, the inference has become so irresistible as to bar out any other possibility.

The greater number of examples of the unreal condition in Pliny show normal forms, that is, subjunctive imperfect to express unreality of the present, and subjunctive pluperfect to express unreality of the past. There are no examples of the preterit use of the imperfect subjunctive,[30] which has been observed throughout the language, but is disappearing at this period. The unreal of the present is the most common form, occurring twenty-three times. Sometimes the thought approaches the ideal very closely, as has been noted. For instance, Ep. VIII. 12. 3: "An, si litibus *tererer*, obstrictum esse me *crederem* obeunti vadimonia mea, nunc, quia mihi omne negotium, omnis in studiis cura, minus obligor tanta sedulitate celebranti in quo obligari ego, ne dicam solo, certe maxime possum?"

It would be natural to consider this ideal, but the context seems to show that the point of view is present, so that the form must be explained as unreal. So too Pan. 9. 13: magnum *videretur* si *dicerem*, "nescisti te imperatorem futurum." The present subjunctive would be possible, and is what we might expect, but the form emphasises the unreality. Such examples as these show the difficulty of drawing a hard and fast line between ideal and unreal in the many instances where it might be possible to differ as to the point of view. It is necessary to take into consideration the full context of such passages before deciding on the classification.

Other examples of the unreal condition with the imperfect subjunctive in both clauses are as follows:[31] Ep. I. 19. 3: 22. 7: II. 1. 10: 9. 3: 13. 11: 16. 4: 18. 2: 18. 4: III. 21. 4: IV. 13. 6: 14. 10: V. 19. 2: VII. 15. 2: VIII. 6. 3: 12. 4: IX. 6. 2: 31. 2: X. 94. 3: Pan. 60. 10: 68. 19: 79. 4.

Unreal of the past, pluperfect subjunctive in both clauses.[32]

[30] See Blase, Geschichte des Irrealis. Erlangen, 1888, p. 52.

[31] Trajan X. 82. 2.

[32] Trajan X. 121, but the reading is doubtful.

Ep. I. 14. 3: qui quidem diu quaerendus *fuisset*, nisi *paratus* et quasi *provisus esset* Minicius Acilianus.

Also, II. 18. 4: III. 9. 14: IV. 7. 3: V. 6. 40: VI. 9. 1: VII. 6. 12: Pan. 6. 11: 8. 19: 64. 7: 90. 12.

Conditional sign omitted, Ep. I. 12. 8: *dedisses* huic animo par corpus, *fecisset* quod optabat.

Pluperfect subjunctive in protasis, imperfect subjunctive in apodosis. Ep. I. 16. 8: an si inter eos quos numquam vidimus *floruisset*, non solum libros ejus verum etiam imagines *conquireremus*.

Also, V. 1. 9: VIII. 20. 2: IX. 28. 3: Pan. 1. 9: 10. 7: 31. 20: 52. 1: 61. 10.

There are a few cases of the imperfect subjunctive in the protasis, followed by the pluperfect in the apodosis. In Pan. 40. 12, this form denotes opposition to a general statement: quo ingenio, si natura *pateretur*, quam libenter tot spoliatis tot trucidatis, sanguinem et bona *refudisses*. In III. 2. 1, the opposition begins in the past and continues into the present: quod ipse amicis tuis *obtulissem*, si mihi eadem materia *suppeteret*, id nunc jure videor a te meis petiturus. So also Pan. 72. 9.

The use of the future active participle as the apodosis of an unreal condition begins with Livy, and is characteristic of Silver Latin. It is to be remarked that the periphrasis for the pluperfect subjunctive, namely the future participle with *eram*, *fui* and *fueram*, which is found often in the classical period, has completely disappeared in Pliny, while the bare participle used predicatively comes into vogue to serve exactly the same purpose. It looks as if this were simply a development from the classical periphrasis, in which the easily supplied *fui* or *fueram* has been dropped as unnecessary and cumbersome.

Pliny has the participle in *-urus* as the apodosis with the pluperfect subjunctive five times:

Ep. III. 13. 1: librum quo nuper optimo principi consul gratias egi misi exigenti tibi, *missurus*, etsi non *exegisses*.

Also, III. 21. 6: V. 21. 4: VII. 27. 14: VIII. 6. 12.

This use of the future participle is a regular development of Silver Latin, and may be paralleled from other writers of the period. Pliny, however, shows two cases where the development has extended to the unreal of the present, and we find the future participle exactly equivalent to the imperfect subjunctive of an unreal condition. This must be explained as an extension of the employment of the participle in the unreal of the past after the feeling for the original form had faded out. It cannot be traced back to an earlier form in *-urus est*, for the classical usage shows only the past tenses with the future participle in the apodosis of unreal conditions. That is to say, when we find the periphrasis with the participle in *-urus* the point of view is always past, while in the sentences in Pliny the point of view is clearly present. We may compare the rare and disputed use of the future infinitive active to represent the imperfect subjunctive as the apodosis of an unreal condition in *oratio obliqua*. This is cited four times from Cicero and Cæsar by Priem,[33] but the cases in point have all been shown to be inconclusive. Riemann[34] maintains with much probability that to represent the imperfect subjunctive in such sentences we always find the periphrastic form, e. g. *scripturum fuisse*. This is what we might logically expect, for *scripturum esse* is the infinitive of the direct *scripturus est*, which may equate with *scribam*, but not with *scriberem*, or *scripsissem*. For the last two we want *scripturus eram*, or the like, just as we find in actual usage.

The employment of *fuisse* in the indirect form confounds the unreal of the past and present, but that is not so difficult, logically, as the confusion of the ideal and unreal which we should have if *scripturum esse* could represent both *scribam* and *scriberem*. We find what seems very like this confusion in Pliny, in the working out of the periphrastic form in *oratio recta*. Compare Ep. VI. 32. 2: te porro animo beatissimum, modicum facultatibus *scio*. itaque partem oneris tui mihi *vin-*

[33] Priem, Die irrealen Bedingungssätze bei Cicero und Caesar, p. 334. (Philol. Suppl. vol. V. p. 263 ff.).

[34] Riemann, Rev. de Philologie, vol. XV. p. 34 ff.

dico et tamquam parens alter puellae nostrae *confero* quinquaginta milia nummum, plus *collaturus*, nisi a verecundia tua sola mediocritate munusculi impetrari posse *confiderem* ne recusares, and VI. 20. 4: surgebam invicem, si *quiescceret*, *excitaturus*.

The point of view in the latter example is past, and the participle equates the ideal imperfect subjunctive, but in the first sentence the point of view is undoubtedly present, and the participle must stand for the unreal imperfect subjunctive. The ideal form is not infrequent in Silver Latin, but I have found no other examples of the unreal. If thrown into the indirect form, *collaturus* would naturally become *collaturum esse*, but no logical explanation could be given. In the same way it is impossible to explain the simple participle as developed independently from an earlier periphrastic expression. It must be regarded as an extension of the use of the participle in the unreal from the point of view of the past, after that had become firmly established.

One other sentence in Pliny shows the same construction, Pan. 4. 6: id nunc eo magis sollemne ac necessarium est, quod parens noster privatas gratiarum actiones cohibet et comprimit, *intercessurus* etiam publicis, si *permitteret* sibi vetare quod senatus juberet.

The imperfect and pluperfect indicative are found in the apodosis of the unreal condition at all periods of the language,[35] usually with some rhetorical colouring. It is sometimes explained that in such sentences we have first something stated as a fact, in a past tense of the indicative, with the information immediately following that this incident did not actually take place, because of the sudden or unexpected intervention of the activity of the *si*-clause. We thus get a vivid idea of how nearly the action was accomplished, which accounts for our usually finding such conditions in rhetorical passages or in vivid narration.

[35] For an historical view of the construction see Blase, Geschichte des Plusquamperfekts. Giessen, 1894, pp. 66 ff. Also Lilie, p. 16, Priem, p. 269 ff.

Madvig expresses nearly the same idea in his Grammar, § 348 d, where he says: "A thing which might have occurred on a certain condition is represented, by a rhetorical emphasis of expression, as if it had already occurred, in order to show how near it was."

But though the apodosis in such sentences is expressed by the indicative, it does not follow that we feel that indicative as a statement of objective fact. When we read "If the Lord himself had not been on our side when men rose up against us, they *had swallowed* us up quick" the indicative of the apodosis does not give us the idea of actual occurrence. So in Horace, O. II. 17. 27, me truncus illapsus cerebro *sustulerat*, nisi Faunus ictum *levasset*, we get no impression that the activity of the verb *sustulerat* actually took place, though the apodosis here precedes the protasis. The unreality is just as strongly present as if we had *sustulisset*, but there is a certain added liveliness and vividness due to the use of the indicative.

Roby thinks this effect is produced by what he calls "wilful exaggeration"; others term it the expression of a higher degree of subjective possibility, but this is misleading, as we have seen. What we have is practically equivalent to a shift in the manner of stating the condition from subjective to objective. The unreality, which is due to inference from the tense employed and from the context, is felt just as strongly as if the condition were expressed by the subjunctive in both clauses, or even more strongly. The effect is to emphasise and draw attention to a state of things which it is easy for the mind to figure as having existed, but which did not actually so exist.

The conditional clause in these sentences usually appears with the negative (*nisi*), in contradiction to the statement of the apodosis, as it is often explained. In many cases *nisi* is practically equivalent to *sed*, but Pliny has only the positive form in the certain examples of the construction which he shows. These are as follows:

Pan. 8. 16: atque adeo temere *fecerat* Nerva si *adoptasset* alium.

Pan. 31. 24: *actum erat* de fecundissima gente, si libera *fuisset*.

(Pan. 64. 2: *peracta erant* sollemnia comitiorum, si prin-

cipem *cogitares*. Blase takes this as an example of an unreal condition, but the *si*-clause is better explained as potential.[36])

Pan. 77. 18: quippe etiam fortuna *videbatur* indignum, si *posset* honores dare qui gerere non posset.

Pan. 88. 15: quod non *erat excogitandum*, si quis *meruisset*.

There is one example in the Pliny-Trajan letters where the apodosis follows:

Ep. X. 61. 4: quorum si nihil nobis loci natura *praestaret*, *expeditum* tamen *erat* cataractis aquae cursum temperare.

In one case we find the apodosis in the perfect indicative, Ep. X. 74. 3: *volui* enim hanc quoque, si inveniri *potuisset*, simul mittere.

Two other cases in which the verb of the apodosis must be supplied probably belong here:

Pan. 5. 17: *obstinatum* enim (*erat*) tibi non suscipere imperium, nisi servandum *fuisset*.

Pan. 47. 13: frustra tamen (*inscripserat*) nisi *adoptasset* qui habitare ut in publicis posset.

I supply *inscripserat* because of the close parallel with Pan. 8. 16.

There are a few other examples of the unreal condition with the protasis involved or understood.

Ep. VIII. 6. 7: gratissima, si . . . *contingeret*.

I. 5. 5: vides quod periculum, si *respondissem*, "bene" quod flagitium, si "male."

Also V. 1. 9: VII. 24. 3. Both verbs are omitted in VI. 2. 4: melius, si ante.

Pliny has 67 examples of the unreal condition. In seven the verb of either protasis or apodosis must be supplied. Of the remaining 60, 47 have the subjunctive in both clauses, either imperfect or pluperfect, and all combinations are represented. The use of the future participle in the apodosis is to be noted, especially in the unreal of the present. There are seven examples. The indicative is found in the apodosis six times.

[36] Cf. Tac. Ann. II. 52. 14; modicam manum, si multitudinem Numidarum . . . spectares, and Pliny Ep. VI. 31. 13. p. 16.

Pliny has 288 examples of complete conditional sentences. Of these, 153 have the indicative in both clauses, 55 have subjunctive protasis with indicative apodosis, and 62 have subjunctive in both. The chief points in which Pliny's use of the conditional sentence differs from that of earlier authors are his strong tendency toward the indicative[37] in the apodosis of the ideal and unreal condition, and the frequency of the potential subjunctive in the logical condition. In addition, the use of the future participle alone in the apodosis is characteristic of the period, and peculiar to Pliny is its employment to represent the imperfect subjunctive in an unreal condition.

V.

SPECIAL CLASSES.

There are a number of special classes of conditional clauses which are best classified under separate heads. First of these I shall consider *concessive conditions*.

We find a concessive force in the conditional protasis, expressed sometimes by *si* alone, followed by *at* or *tamen* in the apodosis, more often by the combination of *si* with *et*, *etiam* and

[37] We find some sentences with the imperfect indicative in the apodosis, and the imperfect subjunctive in the protasis due to the iterative idea. This is a regular development of Silver Latin and is to be expected in any writer of the period. The cases in point are as follows: Ep. VII. 17. 11: VI. 2. 2: Pan. 12 fin: 13. 13: 68. 7: 70. 20. In connection with the use of the indicative in ideal and unreal conditions in *oratio recta*, it may be interesting to remark that we find that the protasis of a logical condition has resisted the attraction of mood, both in *oratio obliqua*, and after verbs of fearing, asking, and the like. In most cases these unchanged forms belong to the future sphere. The examples are: Ep. IV. 13. 2: vereor ne, si hanc intentionem jam in fine intermisero, ægre resumam. Also III. 10. 5: IV. 13. 8: 17. 11: V. 6. 42: 6. 44: 8. 6: 12.1: 19. 8: VI. 25. 1: VII. 1. 3: 16. 4: 17. 1: IX. 3. 3: 13. 17: 21. 4: 37. 1: X. 54. 2: 60: Pan. 36 fin.

tamen et. Pliny uses all these particles. When *si* alone is used the condition is always negative, *e. g:*

Ep. II. 3. 8: proinde *si non* ob alia nosque ipsos, *at* certe ut hunc audias, veni. Also Pan. 32. 8: 89. 6.

With *etiamsi* we find both subjunctive and indicative, in accordance with the general rules governing conditional sentences. Madvig says that with *etiamsi* we find the indicative, unless the condition is negatived, in which case we have the subjunctive, but compare Ep. IX. 26. 2: frequentior currentibus quam reptantibus lapsus, sed his non labentibus nulla, illis non nulla laus, *etiamsi labantur.* It is perhaps better to follow Schmalz and say that the mood after *etiamsi* follows the rules for simple *si.* Other examples are:

Positive, with the indicative: Ep. I. 8. 5: II. 4. 4: III. 9. 37: V. 8. 6: Pan. 85. 10.

Negative, with the subjunctive: Ep. VIII. 5. 1: X. 82. 2: Pan. 9. 3: 83 fin.

Subjunctive, attracted: Ep. II. 16. 2: IX. 28. 3: Pan. 37. 22.

Etsi, like *etiamsi*, follows the usual rules for conditional sentences, but is also found occasionally where no conditional force can be perceived. Here it is nearer akin to *quamquam.* This use practically comes to an end with Cicero, though sporadic cases appear later.[88] So in Ep. I. 10. 2: amari ab eo laboravi, *etsi* non erat laborandum, and compare Pan. 90 fin: *etsi* minus ut bonos, and also Trajan, X. 44, though here the reading is corrupt.

Where the concessive force of *etsi* is also conditional, we find the indicative, with *tamen* as correlative. So Ep. I. 20. 21: quod certe, *etsi* non limatioris, majoris *tamen* ingenii vitium est. Also VI. 27. 2: VIII. 11. 3: Pan. 63. 1: 70. 15.

With the subjunctive and *tamen* correlative, Pan. 79. 15.

Without *tamen*, Ep. III. 13. 1.

In *oratio obliqua*, with *tamen*, Ep. VIII. 6. 10.

Pliny uses *tametsi* three times, all in the epistles. The particle is disappearing at this period, but is characteristic of the epistolary style. Compare its use in the letters of Cicero. The

[88] Draeger II. 764.

examples are: Ep. I. 13. 1: juvat me quod vigent studia. proferunt se ingenia hominum et ostentant, *tametsi* ad audiendum pigre coitur. Also III. 21. 6: IX. 33. 1.

Pliny's use of these concessive particles agrees with that of Cicero rather than with that of his own time. *Etsi* is a favorite word with Cicero, and tends to disappear later. Pliny's use of it may be set down to Ciceronian influence, in view of the fact that it is not found in Sallust, Quintilian or Tacitus. The last particle, *tametsi*, is not used by Tacitus, but is not uncommon in Cicero, especially in the earlier works and in the letters, where it is first found correlative with *tamen*. Compare Pliny Ep. IX. 33. 1, and note that *tametsi* is not found in the Panegyricus.

Somewhat akin to concessive *si* is the limiting combination *si modo*. Cicero is the first to use it, always with the indicative. So also in Pliny, who has eleven examples: Ep. I. 2. 3 and 5: 20. 5: 20. 10: 22. 9: 24. 3: II. 5. 9: 20. 14: III. 1. 1: 15. 3: VIII. 12. 2.

Attracted, with the subjunctive,[89] I. 20. 5: 20. 10: 22. 9.

Si tamen in a limiting sense is similarly used. This combination begins in the Augustan poets, and lasts until the latest times. Pliny has four examples: Ep. II. 1. 10: III. 1. 4 IX. 30. 1: Pan. 20. 11.

Conditional Sentences of Comparison.

Pliny has a varied use of particles in these sentences, and some of the combinations shown are rare.

Ut si, equivalent to *quasi* occurs seven times. This use begins with Cicero and is infrequent elsewhere. Tacitus and Nepos show a few examples, always with the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive, as in Pliny. The unreality which was felt in the comparison may account for the preference for secondary tenses. Cicero has several examples where *ita* is correlative, none are quoted later, but compare Pliny Pan. 76. 17: ille vero ita consul, ut si tantum consul foret.

[89] Trajan X. 91.

Other examples of *ut si*, Pan. 20. 13: 23 fin: 35 fin: 41. 8: 52. 15: 71. 17.

Quasi is used with all tenses of the subjunctive:[40] Ep. II. 20. 11: IV. 2. 4: 10. 2: 10. 4: 19. 8: VI. 5. 5: 6. 5: IX. 33. 5: Pan. 54. 16: 63. 20: with *sic* correl. Ep. VIII. 22. 1: with *ita* correl. Ep. V. 3. 11.

Double condition, Pan. 2. 26: *quasi* non dicturi, *nisi* fecerit.

Quamsi after a comparative: Ep. III. 4. 7: 12. 3: VII. 17. 8: VIII. 6. 7: 6. 9: Pan. 84 fin: 89 fin.

After *alius* and a negative: Pan. 11 fin: 55. 6.

Tam . . . quamsi, Ep. III. 2. 6: VII. 6. 3.

Tamquam is Pliny's favorite comparative particle. It is used over thirty times, usually with the subjunctive. Once it is used with the ablative absolute, Ep. III. 5. 13: tamquam aliqua lege cogente. *Sic* is correlative nine times.

Tamquam . . . sic=ita . . . ut, Pan. 76. 13: This combination is found several times in Cicero, but later it is quoted only from Gellius.

Tamquam equivalent to the *quod* of assumed reason: Pan. 59. 3.

Ita . . . tamquam, Ep. VIII. 22. 2 bis.

Ep. VIII. 6. 14 is singular: incisa et insculpta sunt . . . ornamenta Pallantis, *sic quasi* foedera antiqua, *sic quasi* sacrae leges. Cf. Tac. Dial. 13.

Ac si, after *non secus:* Pan. 12 fin: after *perinde:* X. 61. 2.

Triple comparison: Ep. III. 20. 9: nam *ut* in reciperatoriis judiciis *sic* nos in his comitiis *quasi* repente adprehensi sinceri judices fuimus.

Cicero introduced a delicate use of *ita . . . si*, or *sic . . . si*, in comparisons, and is followed by Livy, but scarcely any other examples are quoted. Pliny has five: Pan. 53 fin: meminerunt *sic* maxime laudari incolumem imperatorem, *si* priores secus meriti reprehendantur.

Also Pan. 68. 2: 69. 7: 72. 10: 72. 12.

The phrase *nisi forte* is found throughout the language, but is extremely rare in early Latin. Cicero is the first to use it at

[40] Trajan X. 76.

all extensively, usually with ironical colouring. Until Apuleius the mood is always indicative.[41] Pliny has five examples: Ep. IV. 27. 2. *nisi forte* me fallit aut amor ejus, aut quod ipsum me laudibus vexit,

Also, Ep. V. 1. 11: VI. 17. 5: VII. 27. 14: IX. 2. 3.

Ep. VII. 27. 14 seems like a combination of *nisi forte* and *nisi quod:*[42] nihil notabile secutum, *nisi forte quod* non fui reus.

"Nothing noteworthy followed, except, perhaps, the fact that I was not brought to trial."

Similar is the use of *nisi vero.* Schmalz, § 344 says: "*Nisi vero*, wie *nisi forte*, fast immer ironisch, ist ausschliesslich Cicero eigen," but Pliny has three cases, possibly due to Ciceronian influence, *e. g.:* Ep. II. 3. 10: VII. 17. 2: Pan. 25. 6.

Nisi tamen begins with Cicero and is found also in Sallust, Celsus, Columella and Quintilian, but not in Tacitus. Pliny has four examples:

Ep. I. 9. 5: neminem ipse reprehendo, *nisi tamen* me, cum parum commode scribo.

Also I. 2. 6: IX. 39. 5: Pan. 93. 10.

Nisi quod, of assumed reason, begins with Plautus and is occasional in Cicero, Sallust and Livy. It is more frequent in Tacitus, and Pliny has sixteen examples. The mood is indicative.

Ep. II. 1. 4: usus est firma valetudine, *nisi quod* solebant ei manus tremere, citra dolorem tamen.

Also III. 7. 2: IX. 26. 1: 40. 2: Pan. 7. 9: 8. 14: 9. 9: 9 fin (subj. attract.) 21. 9: 43. 7: 83. 20: 86. 24.

Nisi quod tamen: Ep. VI. 21. 6: VIII. 17. 6: Pan. 7 fin: 91 fin.

Nisi ut in the sense of *nisi quod* is post-classical. Hand, Tursellinus IV. p. 237 says: "Eadem est caussa in verbis *nisi ut*, in quibus nihil insolitum videtur, quando de consilio est sermo. *Saepe tamen ita loquuti sunt serioris aetatis scriptores, ut intellegendum esset ita ut.*" The sense, however, is hardly that of *ita ut*, but is rather *except on condition that.* Hand quotes Suet. Calig. 23: aviæ Antoniæ secretum petenti dene-

[41] In Sallust, Jug. 14. 10 the subjunctive is due to compression.

[42] Cf. VII. 20. 6: *nisi quis forte* . . .

gavit, *nisi ut* interveniret Macro praefectus. Here *nisi ut* is nearly equivalent in meaning to *nisi quod*, except that *nisi quod* introduces an actual limitation, *nisi ut* a conditional one. So Pliny, Ep. III. 12. 4: neque enim ii sumus quos vituperare ne inimici quidem possint, *nisi ut simul laudent.*

Also II. 11. 16: Pan. 31. 17: 88. 31.

The only other instances of *nisi ut* that are quoted are Tacitus, Ann. III. 57 and Dial. 33. 5.

Pliny has *nisi* with the ablative absolute, equivalent to the protasis of a condition in Ep. II. 14. 3: ne nobilissimis quidem adulescentibus locus erat, *nisi aliquo consulari producente.* The phrase may be turned in English by an abstract: "except by introduction of some consular."

Also II. 17. 22: III. 9. 12: VII. 1. 3.

There are several cases of a parenthetic use of *si*, where the condition is practically lost sight of, and we have merely a vaguely polite formula. For instance, Ep. II. 17. 1: si ita mavis: III. 1. 8: si malint.

III. 18. 4: "si commodum" et "si valde vacaret."

V. 3. 5: et si non sufficiunt exempla privata, divum Julium.

VII. 17. 7: si quid mihi credis.

X. 41. 3: si tibi videbitur.

X. 70. 3: si permiseris.

In Ep. V. 8. 3 we find a *si*-clause used as a wish: si qua me possim tollere humo. Here no apodosis is to be supplied, and the condition is elliptical. The usage is very rare, and chiefly poetic. Compare Vergil. Aen. VI. 187: Si nunc se nobis ille aureus arbore ramus Ostentat nemore in tanto!

VI.

TEMPORAL CLAUSES.

The pages which follow contain an enumeration of the temporal clauses in Pliny grouped under the particles employed. Very little comment has been made in this part of the paper, but it is hoped that the collection of material will be found to be fairly complete.

CUM.

Cum with the Indicative.

Simple dating *cum* with the indicative present.

Ep. I. 5. 8: huic suppliciter, ut est *cum timet* abjectissimus. Also I. 14. 9 bis: 16. 2: 16. 7: 20. 22: II. 17. 24: III. 2. 2: 5. 14: 5. 18: 13. 2: 21. 5 (cum furit . . . cum regnat . . . cum madent): IV. 19. 3: V. 6. 44: VIII. 11. 1: IX. 21. 3: 26. 3: 26. 4 bis: 26. 8: Pan. 1. 6: 11. 8: 12. 11: 12. 12: 30. 14: 48. 4: 58. 9: 59. 6: 60. 24: 64. 4: 89. 7: 89. 9.

Cum dico . . . loquor = when I say . . . I mean: III. 2. 2: 5. 14.

Similar is *cum dico . . . probo*, I. 20. 22.

Iterative, with the indicative present:

Ep. II. 10. 7: quo (silentio) ego, *cum dico* vel *recito*, non minus quam clamore delector.

IV. 17. 10: quod *cum recordor*, intellego mihi laborandum . . . Also I. 8. 15: II. 10. 8: III. 5. 19: 7. 15: V. 13. 10: VI. 20. 18: VII. 19. 2: 30. 4: IX. 2. 4: 6. 3:

Cum . . . nunc, Pan. 89. 1: nunc . . . cum vides.

Sometimes the time idea is very faint, for instance, Ep. I. 9. 5: neminem ipse reprehendo, nisi tamen me, *cum* parum commode *scribo*. Here the causal idea lies very near at hand. So in IX. 23. 6: neque enim vereor ne jactantior videar, *cum* de me aliorum judicium, non meum *profero*, praesertim apud te . . . The causal feeling in this sentence is helped out by the *praesertim* which follows.

Cum with the future and future perfect.

Future in both temporal and principal clauses. Ep. I. 6. 2: proinde cum venabere, licebit. . .

V. 13. 10: erit fortasse . . . *cum* omnes ex necessitate *facient* quod ego sponte faciebam. "There will come a day when . . ."

VI. 29. 6: dices, *cum* velle *debebis*. Also VII. 2. 2: 3. 2: 24. 9: IX. 29. 2.

Cum with the future perfect in the temporal clause, future, or an imperative or equivalent in the principal clause.

Ep. I. 16. 3: Senties quod ego, *cum* orationes ejus in manus *sumpseris*.

V. 14. 9: ne quis, *cum* in urbem *rediero*, contubernio nostro dies pereat. Also I. 10. 11: II. 17. 1: 18. 3: III. 1. 12: 6. 7: IV. 5. 3: 19. 1: VI. 4. 5: 23. 4: VII. 6. 4: 12. 6: 22. 1: 22. 3: IX. 28. 4: Pan. 61 fin.[43]

Cum with the future in the temporal clause, present indicative in principal clause: VI. 29. 6: with perfect indicative in the principal clause, IV. 29. 1.

A number of cases of *cum* with the future and future perfect are scarcely to be distinguished from conditions. For instance, Ep. I. 18. 6: agamque causam tuam, ut istam agere tu, *cum voles*, possis.

So VI. 2. 9: Praeterea an sint supervacua, *nisi cum audieris*, scire non possis. In this example *nisi cum* seems almost equivalent to *nisi*.

I. 9. 3: haec quo die feceris necessaria, eadem, *si* cotidie fecisse te *reputes*, inania videntur, multo magis, *cum secesseris*. Here the *si*-clause and the *cum*-clause are paralleled.

Pan. 53 fin: nam *cum* de malo principe posteri *tacent*, manifestum est eadem facere praesentem. Here the universal present is used with *cum* in a conditional sense.

Cum with the perfect indicative in the temporal clause, present indicative in the principal clause.[44]

Ep. I. 20. 13: praeterea suae quisque inventioni favet et quasi fortissimum amplectitur, *cum* ab alio *dictum est* quod ipse praevidit. Also I. 16. 7: II. 14. 7: IV. 14. 6: 19. 3: 30. 10: (three times): VII. 10. 1: IX. 17. 3: 36. 1: Pan. 87. 10.

Perfect indicative in both clauses.

Ep. III. 10. 1: composuisse me quaedam de filio vestro non dixi vobis, *cum* proxime apud vos *fui*. Also IV. 13. 3: 23. 1:[45] V. 16. 7: VII. 11. 5: IX. 31. 1: Pan 56. 21: 94. 13.

[43] Trajan X. 28: 57. 1.

[44] Trajan has one case of the Greek aorist equivalent to the perfect, with *tunc* correlative: X. 119. 1: Iselasticum *tunc* primum mihi videtur incipere deberi, *cum* quis in civitatem suam ipse εἰσήλασεν.

[45] Cf. Kühner § 149. 6.

Cum with the perfect indicative in temporal clause, pluperfect indicative in principal clause.

Ep. VII. 25. 3: et coeperam, *cum* ille me doctissimo sermone *revocavit* ad studia. Also Pan. 8. 9: 91. 2: principal clause in imperfect indicative, Pan. 31. 26.

Cum with the imperfect indicative in both clauses:[46]

Pan. 58. 5: *erat* in senatu ter consul, *cum* tu tertium consulatum *recusabas*. Also Ep. VIII. 14. 13: Pan. 33 fin.

The imperfect indicative with *cum* is chiefly Ciceronian according to Hoffmann.[47] Cicero and Cornificius have 241 examples, Livy 22, Sallust 2, and Nepos and Tacitus one each. The usage has become sporadic by Pliny's time.

Cum inversum with the present indicative.

Ep. I. 12. 10: perveneram in proximum, *cum* mihi ab eadem Hispulla Julius Atticus *nuntiat* . . . Also VI. 24. 2.

With the perfect indicative, V. 14. 1.

Cum interea with the perfect indicative (adversative) Pan. 4. 14.

Cum interim with the present indicative (causal) Ep. III. 7. 11: 16. 13.

With the imperfect indicative, Ep. VIII. 14. 13.

Cum interea with the subjunctive, Pan. 76. 3: *cum interea* nihil praeter consulem *ageres*.

Cum interim and *cum interea* used to give an illustration are chiefly Ciceronian. Hoffmann quotes a few examples each from Sallust, Livy and Tacitus. The subjunctive is quoted only from Cicero.

Cum explicative, with the indicative.

Pan. 38. 14: *augeo*, patres conscripti, principis munus, *cum* ostendo liberalitati ejus inesse rationem. Also Ep. IV. 22. 4: VIII. 14. 19.

Cum with correlative *tum* or *tunc*, present indicative in both clauses.

Ep. II. 17. 19: ipsa vero cryptoporticus *tum* maxime caret

[46] Pan. 14. 14 may belong here, but the text is very corrupt: *et* + *cum subsequebatur*.

[47] Zeitpartikeln, 1873, p. 88.

sole, *cum* ardentissimus culmini ejus insistit. Also III. 9. 10. With the perfect indicative: VIII. 20. 7.

Inverted, with the present indicative: Ep. I. 8. 5: III. 4. 8: V. 15. 1: VIII. 18. 12:

Cum . . . *tunc* with the present indicative: VII. 17. 9:

Inverted:[48] IX. 21. 2: Pan. 85. 15.

With the perfect indicative: Pan. 94. 9: 95. 9.

We also find *cum* correlative with *tum* followed by the subjunctive. In the Pliny-Trajan letters, 81. 1, we have: *cum* Cocceianus Dion in bule adsignari civitati opus cuius curam egerat *vellet*, *tum* Eumolpus adsistente Flavio Archippo *dixit*. *Cum* here may be said to characterise the situation, and the fact that it precedes makes the subjunctive somewhat easier. In Pan. 35. 7. *tum* precedes: quantum diversitas temporum posset *tum* maxime cognitum est *cum* isdem quibus antea cautibus innocentissimus quisque tunc nocentissimus *adfigeretur*, *cumque* insulas omnes quas modo senatorum, jam delatorum turba *compleret*.

In this sentence *cum* is evidently causal, as it probably is in Pan. 59 fin. where the text is uncertain: *tum* inest utrique non nulla diversitas, *cum* principem . . . quam dissimillimum *deceat*.

Draeger gives a few examples of *tum* . . . *cum* and the like with the subjunctive, beginning with Cicero, then once in Ovid and twice in Gellius. He says that when we find the subjunctive in such clauses "dann wird nicht der temporale Ausdruck allein, sondern der Inhalt des ganzen Hauptsatzes zeitlich bestimmt oder charakterisirt." Compare for this in addition to the examples already given, Ep. III. 11. 5: V. 14. 5: X. 118. 3: Pan. 5. 6.

In the two cases in the Panegyricus the causal idea is the leading one, and the subjunctive is probably due to this fact. Pan. 14. 3 is to be noted: jam *tum* mererere *cum* ferociam . . . *cohiberes*. Here we have a list of *cum* clauses, all with the imperfect subjunctive, giving, in Professor Hale's phrase, the character of the situation, and the *tum* . . . *cum* clause, imbedded in these, naturally takes the same mood and tense.

[48] *Tunc* . . . *cum* with the future perfect, Trajan X. 40. 1.

Cum . . . tum in the sense of *non modo . . . sed etiam.*[49]

Ep. I. 8. 6: cogimur *cum* de munificentia parentum nostrorum *tum* de nostra disputare. Also I. 10. 8: II. 11. 10: II. 19. 8: III. 11. 8: 18. 8: 19. 9: IV. 3. 2: VI. 4. 4: 18. 3: 27. 4: IX. 27. 1: 35. 1: Pan. 14. 9: 51. 12: 75. 8: 85. 18: 90. 1: 95. 4 (but here the text is doubtful).

Tum is sometimes reinforced by another adverb.

Tum etiam: Ep. IV. 5. 3: VIII. 2. 7: Pan. 56. 15. This is quoted chiefly from Cicero, but there are also some instances in Livy and Nepos.

Tum quoque: IV. 8. 1. *Tum vel maxime:* V. 3. 1: Pan. 41. 14. *Tum praecipue:* VII. 8. 3. *Non cum . . . tum vel:* Pan. 47. 10.

Sometimes the correspondence is not exactly that expressed by *non modo . . . sed etiam*, but seems nearer akin to the Greek *μέν . . . δέ*. So for instance in Ep. IV. 28. 3: nam *cum* est arduum similitudinem effingere ex vero, *tum* longe difficillima est imitationis imitatio. Compare also V. 3. 1: VII. 8. 3.

Cum with the Subjunctive.

Historical or Descriptive Cum.

This use of *cum* is regular with the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive. It has been defined as characterising the situation, or giving the attendant circumstances. It is, however, difficult if not impossible to draw any real distinction in meaning which will hold for all indicative and all subjunctive temporal clauses. In many cases both indicative and subjunctive give the attendant circumstances or the date with no essential difference in feeling. The tenses are employed regularly, the imperfect to express contemporaneous, the pluperfect antecedent, action.

With the imperfect subjunctive:

Ep. I. 5. 4: haec me Regulus dolenter tulisse credebat, ideoque etiam, *cum recitaret* librum, non adhibuerat. Also I. 20. 14: 23. 2: II. 1. 5: 11. 22: 13. 5: 14. 10: 14. 12: III. 5. 3: 5. 4: 9. 25: 9. 34: 14. 2: 14. 6: 16. 9: 16. 10: IV. 3. 3: 9. 18 bis:

[49] Nerva, Ep. X. 58. 10.

11. 9 bis: 11. 10: 19. 7: 22. 3: V. 21. 4: VI. 3. 1: 5. 1: 8. 3: 15. 2: 16. 12: VII. 1. 5: 4. 3: 4. 6: 19. 5: 19. 11: 20. 4: 24. 6: 30. 5: 31. 2: VIII. 2. 6: 18. 9: X. 6. 1: 33. 1: 47. 1: 49. 2: 58. 1: 81. 1: 87. 1: Pan. 14. 2: 14. 3: 14. 6: 14. 12: 26. 24: 34. 16: 48. 12: 61. 2: 62. 6: 64. 5: 65. 12: 71. 2: 71. 16 (*quippe cum*): 71. 18: 74. 3: 82. 7.[50]

With the pluperfect subjunctive:

Ep. III. 9. 20: itaque, *cum* ad nomen ejus in extrema actione *venissem*, . . . honestissimum credidi non premere immeren tem . . . Also II. 20. 10: III. 4. 2: 11. 2: 18. 4 bis: IV. 11. 3: 11. 6: 11. 9: 12. 2: 16. 1 (periphrastic): 17. 8: 24. 1: V. 6. 1: VI. 8. 3: 10. 1: 12. 4: 31. 11: VII. 1. 5: 4. 4: 6. 4: 33. 4: IX. 13. 4: 23. 1: X. 3. 2: 17A. 2: 31. 2: 74. 2: 81. 3: 81. 4:[51] Pan. 10. 24.

The subjunctive of iterative action with the third person is characteristic of this period, but is denied for Pliny by Draeger, who follows Kraut. There are a few examples, however.[52]

Ep. III. 7. 5: salutabatur, colebatur multumque in lectulo jacens cubiculo semper non ex fortuna frequenti doctissimis sermonibus dies transigebat, *cum* a scribendo vacaret. Also III. 16. 5 (cf. III. 4. 6): Pan. 18. 10: 61. 24 (cf. Ep. I. 12. 6).

With the second person: Pan. 71 fin: 86. 6.

Temporal *cum* is used a number of times with no verb expressed.

With nouns, Ep. II. 17. 16: *cum* serenus dies et inmotus . . . cum inquietus. Also IV. 22. 6: VIII. 14. 7 bis: 20. 1.

With adverbs, III. 5. 8: *cum* tardissime. Also Pan. 61. 23.

With a participle: VII. 1. 4: *cum* perustus ardentissima febre.

Cum used with the subjunctive, when the mood is due to attraction or to total or partial obliquity.

Attracted: Ep. V. 6. 6: 7. 4: VI. 1. 2: X. 12. 1: Pan. 3. 12: 9 fin. bis: 14. 15.

[50] Trajan X. 60. 1.

[51] The reading here is doubtful, but owing to the mood the emendation *cum* seems necessary.

[52] Compare Ep. V. 6. 10, cum primum prosecatur, adsurgit.

Oblique: I. 5. 11: 13. 3 (three times): 20. 7: II. 3. 10: 20. 13: III. 5. 12 bis: 5. 17: 7. 13: 9. 16: 12. 2: VII. 24. 5: X. 74. 1: 96. 5: Pan. 9. 5: 9. 7: 25. 19 bis: 37. 21.

Cum causal is found with the subjunctive of all tenses.

Cum causal with the present subjunctive:[53] Ep. II. 16. 4: cum vero liceat heredi donare quod in hereditate subsedit, nihil est quod . . . Also II. 13. 9: 19. 6: III. 3. 1: 8. 3: 10. 4 (praecipue cum): 18. 10: IV. 10. 3: 15. 2: 15. 13 19. 1: 24. 6: 26. 2: V. 7. 3: VI. 30. 1: VII. 15. 3: 20. 7: 23. 2: 25. 1: 30. 1 bis: 33. 3: 33. 5: VIII. 6. 7: 6. 13: 11. 3: 14. 1: 14. 19: 14. 24: 24. 9: IX. 16. 1: 20. 1: 39. 1: X. 3. 3: 4. 4: 8. 6: 13. 1: 39. 6: 51. 2; 81. 8: Pan. 25. 1: 31. 6: 52. 6: 54. 11: 67. 24: 68. 2: 68. 4: 68. 10: 68. 11: 80 fin: 82. 22: 83. 24: 84. 10: 85. 12: 85. 16: 85 fin: 86. 13: 87. 12.

With the imperfect subjunctive:[54]

Ep. I. 5. 9: coimus in porticum Liviae, *cum* alter ad alterum *tenderemus*. Also I. 8. 12: 8. 13: III. 9. 5: 9. 8: IV. 17. 9: VI. 22. 4: 31. 8: VII. 9. 15: 12. 4: VIII. 14. 8 bis: 14. 26: IX. 10. 2: X. 106. 120. 2: Pan. 13. 2: 13. 3: 13. 9: 13. 12: 14. 2: 14 fin: 20. 12: 22. 14: 23. 21: 33. 4: 37. 15: 43 fin: 47. 5: 52. 10: 52 fin: 54. 2: 59. 11: 68. 6: 70. 10: 70. 18: 71. 5: 82 fin: 86. 14: 94. 10.

With the perfect subjunctive:[55]

Ep. I. 7. 1: vide in quo me fastigio collocaris *cum* mihi idem potestatis idemque regni *dederis*, quod Homerus Jovi optimo maximo. Also I. 8. 17 bis: II. 4. 2 bis: 16. 2: IV. 1. 5: 3. 5: 5. 2: 9. 17: VI. 12. 3: 18. 2: VII. 18. 4: 27. 16: 31. 6: VIII. 18. 1: X. 2. 2: 17A. 2: 31. 1: 87. 3: Pan. 46. 14: 46. 19: 55. 5: 68. 13.

With the pluperfect subjunctive:[56]

Ep. I. 8. 1: peropportune mihi redditae sunt litterae tuae,

[53] Trajan X. 50: 62: 82. 2: 91: 95: 105. Nerva X. 58. 7.
[54] Trajan 30. 2: 121.
[55] Trajan X. 7. 1: 40. 3: 48. 1.
[56] Trajan X. 82. 1.

quibus flagitabas ut tibi aliquid ex scriptis meis mitterem, *cum* ego id ipsum *destinassem*. Also II. 1. 2: 11. 2: III. 10. 1: IV. 9. 9: 9. 20: VI. 22. 2: 31. 10: VII. 1. 7: 11. 6: 16. 2: VIII. 6. 10: X. 3A. 2: 8. 1: Pan. 25. 8: 30. 12: 38. 21.

Praesertim cum, always causal:[57]

Ep. IV. 9. 7: praeterea rem manifestam infitiari augentis erat crimen, non diluentis, *praesertim cum* reus ipse nihil integrum advocatis *reliquisset*. Also I. 8. 12: II. 13. 9: 16. 3: V. 6. 41: VI. 2. 8: IX. 20. 1: 37. 1: X. 27: 29. 2: 67. 2: Pan. 90. 11.

Cum concessive, like *cum* causal, is used with the subjunctive of all tenses, but is not so frequent.

With the present subjunctive:

Ep. II. 12. 2: quae sententia tamquam mitior vicit, *cum sit* alioqui durior tristiorque. Also II. 6. 7: 12. 5: IV. 23. 1: V. 6. 14: VI. 32. 1 (quamvis correl.): VIII. 22. 1: IX. 35. 1: X. 8. 5: 77. 2: Pan. 31. 4: 41. 9: 41 fin: 44. 21: 49. 19: 50. 1: 63. 15: 68. fin: 83. 10: 86. 10.

With the imperfect subjunctive:

Ep. III. 2. 4: ideo se in equestri gradu tenuit, *cum* facile *posset* ascendere altissimum. Also I. 12. 6: III. 9. 7: 11. 3: IV. 9. 17: VI. 31. 9: VII. 6. 12: 24. 5: VIII. 5. 1: 23. 9: X. 81. 5: Pan. 10. 11: 14. 21: 21. 10: 41. 7: 50. 19: 56. 16: 61. 9: 88. 1: 95. 12.

With the perfect subjunctive:[58]

Ep. I. 8. 9: nam *cum* omnes homines ad custodiam ejus natura *restrinxerit*, nos contra, etc. Also I. 10. 7: Pan. 51. 4.

With the pluperfect subjunctive:

Ep. II. 1. 8: sic ad omnes honores meos ex secessibus accurrit, *cum* jam pridem ejus modi officiis *renuntiasset*. Also II. 1. 9: III. 5. 5: 5. 20: 18. 1: IV. 11. 6: 17. 4: VII. 6. 4: VIII. 6. 11: 18. 2.

[57] Trajan X. 60.
[58] Trajan X. 57. 2.

It may be convenient to summarise Pliny's use of *cum*, as follows:

Simple dating *cum*, with the indicative present	37
Iterative, with the indicative present	12
Nunc correlative	1
Causal, with the indicative	2
Cum temporal with the future and future perfect	24
Cum conditional	12
Cum with past tenses of the indicative	27
Cum inversum	3
Cum interea (*interim*)	4
Cum explicative	3
Cum with *tunc* or *tum* correlative, with the indicative	12
Total, with the indicative	137

Cum descriptive, with the imperfect subjunctive	64
" " " " pluperfect "	31
Iterative, with the subjunctive	6
Cum with *tunc* or *tum* correlative, with the subjunctive	8
Cum causal with the present subjunctive	58
" " " " imperfect "	40
" " " " perfect "	24
" " " " pluperfect "	17
Praesertim cum (causal)	12
Cum concessive with the present subjunctive	20
" " " " imperfect "	20
" " " " perfect "	3
" " " " pluperfect "	10
Total, with the subjunctive	313

The proportion of subjunctives to indicatives after *cum* is about 2¼ to 1. This is a decidedly larger proportion of indicatives than has been observed in any author of the classical period or later, with the sole exception of Sallust, who shows in the *Catiline* and *Jugurtha* 40 subjunctives to 29 indicatives. This return to the indicative after *cum* is not due to a sharp differentiation between temporal and descriptive, or characterising clauses; in all clauses of this kind both subjunctive and indicative are used after *cum* with apparent interchangeability.

But the general tendency to employ the indicative more widely is sufficiently marked to be worthy of note, both in *cum*-clauses and in the ideal and unreal conditions.

TEMPORAL CLAUSES WITH VARIOUS PARTICLES.

Temporal Clauses of Antecedent Action.

POSTQUAM.

Pliny always uses *postquam* with the indicative, and the tense most commonly employed is, as usual, the historical perfect.

Ep. II. 15. 1: placent agri, *postquam* tui facti sunt.

II. 20. 8: *postquam* signatum est testamentum, mutat personam. Also IV. 11. 3: 17. 4: VI. 2. 5: VII. 27. 10: IX. 31. 1: X. 17A. 1: 118. 2: Pan. 56. 14: 65. 12: 80 fin: 95. 2.

Postquam with the imperfect is characteristic of Livy, and can scarcely be considered more than sporadic elsewhere. Pliny has one example: Pan. 7. 8: suscepisti imperium, *postquam* alium suscepti paenitebat.

A somewhat peculiar causal force of *postquam* has been observed. This is found with the present and perfect indicative, and Pliny shows several cases. For instance, Ep. V. 14. 2: meo (nomine) quod aliquanto magis me delectae mandatum mihi officium, *postquam* par Cornuto datum *video*. The force of *postquam* in these cases is nearly equivalent to the French "maintenant que," or the English "now that." It is chiefly comic, but there are a few examples in Cicero and later.[59] Other examples in Pliny are: Ep. VI. 1. 1: VII. 22. 1: Pan. 13. 18: 41. 16: 49. 8.

With the perfect: Pan. 13. 16: 32. 2.

There seems to be an iterative force in Ep. I. 9. 4: quod evenit mihi *postquam* in Laurentino meo aut lego aliquid aut scribo. Also III. 21. 3: nam *postquam* desiimus facere laudanda, laudari quoque ineptum putamus.

[59] Cf. Draeger II. p. 585.

Postquam with the pluperfect, always rare, occurs once in Pliny, Ep. VI. 13. 3: *postquam* erant data, censuerunt.[60]

Ep. II. 1. 12 is peculiar: vivit enim vivetque semper atque etiam latius in memoria hominum et sermone versabitur, *postquam* ab oculis *recessit*.

Here the perfect cannot be translated as historical, and is really equivalent to a future perfect. It might be possible to take it as causal.

UBI.

Ubi in the temporal sense closely resembles *postquam* as regards its use. In Pliny it is usually found with the perfect, so in Ep. II. 14. 10: *ubi* silentium factum est, repetit quod abruperat. Also II. 20. 3: III. 1. 8: VI. 16. 20: VII. 27. 7: 27. 13: IX. 13. 7: Pan. 23. 12: with *ibi* correlative, Pan. 68. fin.

Ubi has an iterative force, with the subjunctive, Ep. IX. 33. 8: with the indicative present, Pan. 44. 27.

No verb expressed, VIII. 14. 6: IX. 36, 3: Pan. 12. 13.

Examples of *ubi* are fairly numerous, but its range is limited. The only departure from classical usage is the one case of the iterative subjunctive, which begins in Horace, becomes more common in Livy and Tacitus, and then practically disappears.

UT.

Ut as a temporal particle is found in Pliny with past tenses of the indicative only.

With the perfect: Ep. II. 20. 3: *ut* diu miseram expectatione suspendit, "habes" inquit "climactericum tempus, sed evades." Also IX. 13. 5: 36. 3 (iterative): X. 33. 2: Pan. 9. 15.

With the historical present, IV. 20. 5.

Ut with the pluperfect indicative begins with Cicero, and is found occasionally from his time on, often with iterative meaning. For example, Ep. I. 1. 1: collegi non servato temporis ordine, sed *ut quæque* in manus venerat. IV. 20. 1: *ut quemque* perlegeram.

[60] Cf. Trajan X. 119: postea . . . quam . . . vicerant.

Statim ut, with the pluperfect: II. 3. 8: *statimque ut* viderat. Subjunctive in *oratio obliqua:* V. 21. 1: *statim ut* venissem.

UT PRIMUM.

Ut primum is used by Pliny chiefly with the future perfect. I have not found this usage noted elsewhere. The examples are:[61] Ep. I. 9. 7: proinde tu strepitum istum . . . *ut primum* fuerit occasio, relinque.

III. 6. 6: ego signum ipsum, *ut primum* invenero aliquem qui non gravetur, mittam tibi . . . Also III. 1. 11: IV. 27. 5: VIII. 3. 2: IX. 16. 2: In the last example we have an equivalent for the future perfect: *ut primum videbuntur defervisse*, mittemus.

In all these cases the main clause contains a future or equivalent.

The perfect is also found: Ep. VI. 6. 5: me certe, *ut primum* sibi judicare permisit, ad amorem imitationemque delegit. Also X. 3_A. 1.

Temporal Clauses of Contemporaneous Action.

Pliny uses the conjunctions *dum*, *donec*, *quamdiu* and *quoad*. *Dum* is, as usual, the most frequent.

DUM.

Dum is used of complete coextension, with the present indicative, Ep. II. 5. 3: *dum* ornare patriam et amplificare gaudemus, pariter et defensioni ejus servimus et gloriae. Also II. 13. 9: IV. 30. 9: V. 5. 8: VI. 4. 5: VII. 26. 1: Pan. 44 fin.

Dum used of partial coextension is more frequent, always with the present indicative.

Ep. II. 1. 5: hunc, *dum* sequitur colligitque, per leve et lubricum pavimentum fallente vestigio cecidit. Also I. 8. 4 bis: III. 5. 14: 9. 35 bis: 16. 12: 19. 6: 21. 5: IV. 21. 2: V. 19. 6 bis: 21. 3: VI. 20. 13: 22. 4 bis: 33. 11: VII. 9. 4: 9. 16: 17. 6 (three times): 19. 1: 19. 2: VIII. 10. 1: 14. 5: 17. 3: 18. 3: IX. 5. 2: 19. 8: 26. 13: 33. 1: X. 19. 2: 39. 6: 74. 2: Pan. 30. 20: 61. 33: 64. 2: 84 fin: 86. 5.[62]

[61] Trajan X. 9. 1.

[62] Trajan X. 38.

Dum in the sense of "until," with the historical perfect: Ep. I. 5. 15: neque enim volui progredi longius, ut mihi omnia libera servarem, *dum* Mauricus venit.

Dum in the sense of "until," with the subjunctive, always with a strong feeling of suspense: Ep. VIII. 5. 3: ero ergo suspensus pro homine amicissimo, *dum* admittere avocamenta et cicatricem pati possit. Also X. 31. 4: 72:

X. 52 seems to be causal: diem, domine, quo servasti imperium, *dum* suscipis, quanta mereris laetitia celebravimus. Also V. 6. 1: VI. 19. 6.

Dum and *dum modo* in the sense of "provided that," with the present subjunctive: Ep. I. 2. 6: sed sane blandiantur, *dum* per hoc mendacium nobis studia nostra commendent. Also IV. 11. 16: IX. 13. 11: 26. 13: X. 114. 1: Pan. 27. 6 bis.

Once we find the present indicative: IX. 13. 12: . . . nec recuso, si ita casus attulerit, luere poenas ob honestissimum factum, *dum* flagitiosissimum ulciscor.

DONEC.

This conjunction is rare until after Cicero's time, and when it does occur in the earlier period it is always with the indicative. The meaning is at first "until," but with the Augustan writers we find *donec* in the sense of *quamdiu*, and followed by the subjunctive when suspense or design enters into the conception. Individual preference is strongly shown in the use of *donec*. Cæsar, Sallust, and Varro in the *De Re Rustica* avoid it altogether, while Tacitus and the elder Pliny employ it freely with indicative and subjunctive, to mean both "until" and "so long as."

The younger Pliny uses it only in the sense of "until" and almost always with the subjunctive.

With the present subjunctive:

Ep. VII. 13. 1: ita plane, *donec* distinctius quod sentio enuntiem. Also III. 10. 4: IX. 13. 17: Pan. 78: 16.

With the imperfect subjunctive, usually with the idea of design:[63]

[63] Trajan X. 121.

Ep. X. 58. 4: nihil decernendum putavi, *donec* te consulerem de eo quod mihi constitutione tua dignum videbatur. Also Pan. 21. 5: 26. 7: Ep. IX. 33. 6 (but cf. Draeg. II. p. 614. *δ*).

In Ep. VI. 20. 20 no verb is expressed, but *esset* must be understood: nobis tamen ne tunc quidem, quamquam et expertis periculum et expectantibus, abeundi consilium, *donec* de avunculo nuntius.

It is used once with the perfect indicative, to give a definite limit, Ep. IV. 11. 8: dixit, *donec* ad supplicium . . . ducta est.

QUAMDIU.

This particle is never common. It appears first in Cicero with *tamdiu* correlative, afterwards it is sporadic. Until very late the sense is always "so long as" and the mood is usually the indicative. Sallust, Tacitus and Florus do not use it. Nepos has two examples. Pliny has a few cases, without correlatives.

With the future, Ep. VII. 3. 2: quousque vigilabis cum voles, dormies *quamdiu* voles? Also Pan. 52. 12.

With the imperfect indicative, Ep. VI. 1. 1: quamdiu ego trans Padum, tu in Piceno (erat), minus te requirebam.

Imperfect subjunctive,[64] partially oblique, Pan. 10. 17.

Pan. 84. 17 has *quamdiu* with the pluperfect subjunctive, apparently in a causal sense:

Obtulerat illis senatus cognomen Augustarum, quod certatim deprecatae sunt, *quamdiu* appellationem patris patriae tu *recusasses*.[65]

QUOAD.

This conjunction appears twice in Pliny, in the past sphere.

Ep. I. 12. 5: hunc abstinentia sanctitate, *quoad* viridis aetas, vicit et fregit.

III. 1. 12: *quoad* honestum fuit, obiit officia.

Temporal Clauses of Subsequent Action.

Pliny uses both *antequam* and *priusquam*, with marked preference for *antequam*. This is contrary to the usage of the

[64] Quamdiu = how long, with the subjunctive, Ep. X. 45.

[65] Cf. English "as long as" = "in consideration of the fact that."

earlier and classical periods, where *priusquam* is much more common. The frequent use of *antequam* seems especially characteristic of Pliny, for of the later writers Vitruvius and Tacitus greatly prefer *priusquam*, and Nepos does not use *antequam* at all.

Pliny shows *antequam* twenty times, *priusquam* three times. The subjunctive usually follows, but the imperfect indicative is found once with *antequam* after a positive antecedent.[66] Ep. VIII. 14. 5: inde honores petituri adsistebant curiae foribus et consilii publici spectatores *antequam* consortes *erant*.

With the perfect indicative: Pan. 92. 1: illud vero quam insigne, quod nobis praefectis aerario consulatum *antequam* successorem dedisti!

With the present subjunctive: Ep. I. 16. 7: est ergo mecum per diem totum: eundem *antequam* scribam, eundem cum scripsi.

Imperative in the main clause: VI. 23. 4: VIII. 4. 6.

Present subjunctive with *priusquam*, after a negative antecedent,[67] Ep. VIII. 20. 8.

The imperfect subjunctive, due to the notion of ideal limit, or of design, is the form which is most usual: Ep. V. 9. 4: jurare priusquam agerent jubebantur. Also V. 13. 6.

With *antequam*, Ep. I. 16. 1: V. 18. 1: VIII. 20. 9: Pan. 26. 10: 64. 11: 95. 11.

Subjunctive due to *oratio obliqua* or attraction: Ep. III. 9. 14: IV. 11. 13: X. 81. 1: 118. 2: Pan. 10. 8: 21. 8: 69. 14.

In Ep. VIII. 14. 3 there is a curious use of *antequam* with the perfect infinitive, which seems very similar to the Greek infinitive with πρίν: cuius (libertatis) dulcedine accensi cogimur quaedam facere *antequam nosse*.

Pliny's use of temporal particles conforms to classical, or immediately post-classical canons. The number of particles

[66] See Hoffmann, Zeitpartikeln, p. 175, and cf. Pan. 15. 11, where no verb is expressed, but the imperfect indicative is probable.

[67] See Hand, IV. 569 and cf. Trajan, X. 46, where the mood is due to attraction.

employed is large, the only important omissions being *simul ac* and *cum primum*. There are a few distinctive peculiarities, of which the most noticeable are the future perfect after *ut primum*, the use of *quamdiu*, and the marked preference for *antequam*. In the use of moods in temporal clauses Pliny prefers the indicative, except after *donec*, *antequam* and *priusquam*, where the subjunctive prevails.

In general, Pliny's model seems to be the prose of the classical period rather than that of his own time. He has very few dislikes, but on the other hand, he does not introduce many new forms. Most of the peculiarities shown go back to Cicero, whose influence is probably stronger because most of Pliny's work is cast in the epistolary form. Some marked Ciceronianisms are: the use of the future indicative in both protasis and apodosis of the logical condition, the use of concessive particles, the employment of *sic . . . si* and other special comparative forms, the use of *nisi vero*, and the imperfect indicative after *cum*. There are some other minor points which have been noted in passing. The free use of the potential subjunctive in the protasis of the logical condition may also be traced to Cicero. The future perfect after *ut primum* and the preference for *antequam* seem to be characteristic of Pliny.

The most important peculiarity of style that appears, and the one which with few exceptions is to be remarked in all the constructions studied, is the preference for the indicative mood wherever it is possible to use it. This is especially marked with *cum*, but it is also noticeable in the ideal and unreal conditional clauses. In the temporal clauses the indicative is strictly adhered to where we might expect the occasional intrusion of the subjunctive at this period. The only exceptions to this preference for the indicative are the use of the potential subjunctive in logical conditions, and of the subjunctive after *donec*, *antequam* and *priusquam*.

LIFE.

I was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 1872. In the autumn of 1891 I entered Bryn Mawr College and remained one year. I re-entered the college in the autumn of 1893 and completed the work for the degree of A. B., which I received in June, 1896. I continued in residence as a graduate student at Bryn Mawr until 1899. I was awarded a Scholarship in Latin for the year 1896–97, and in June, 1897, I received the degree of A. M. I was awarded the Fellowship in Latin for the year 1898–99, and in May, 1899, I passed the examinations for the degree of Ph. D., offering Latin as my principal subject, and Greek as my subordinate subject. Throughout my undergraduate and graduate course I made Latin and Greek my chief subjects of study, under the direction of Professors Gonzalez Lodge and Herbert Weir Smyth. I wish to express my thanks to them both, and especially to Dr. Lodge, to whom I am deeply indebted for constant advice and encouragement.

Date Due


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